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PATENTS FOR SHARING 
Toshiko Takenaka* 
Spurred by the Internet, emerging technologies have changed the way 
commercial firms innovate and have made it possible for individuals to 
play an important role in that innovation. Producers in the Information 
Communication Technologies (ICT), and other sectors dealing with 
complex technologies with many separately patentable components, 
find it increasingly difficult to make products without infringing on 
patents held by others. Numerous overlapping patents often cover such 
products. Producers have developed a new way to use patents: as 
inclusive rights for sharing their technologies with others through 
cross-licensing and other private ordering arrangements in order to 
ensure the freedom to operate and innovate. Individual innovators, and 
open source software (“OSS”) programmers in particular, have also 
developed a new use of copyrights: using them to share their 
technologies through OSS licenses. Producers of complex technologies 
use patents for sharing their technologies with OSS programmers and 
for protecting themselves from patent assertion. In light of these recent 
uses, this article proposes a new utilitarian theory for patents: patents 
as the incentive to share, with the reward of increasing the freedom to 
operate and innovate. It argues that both the ex ante and ex post 
incentive to invent theories are outdated because they fail to take into 
account the patent owners’ lack of control over their products in 
complex technology sectors. This article urges Congress to reevaluate 
U.S. patent rights in light of this new patent use. It reviews U.S. 
patents as property rights from the comparative law perspective and 
proposes the revitalization of the inclusive side of U.S. patents by 
introducing a compulsory license for blocking patents. It also proposes 
that the exclusive side of patent rights should be limited to private and 
experimental use exceptions to ensure the freedom to operate and 
innovate by sharing. 
 * Washington Research Foundation Professor of Technology Law, University of 
Washington School of Law; Professor, Keio University Law School. The author wants to 
thank her research assistants, Mika Ito and Quinlan Wheeler, J.D. students, and Ms. Cindy 
Fenster, Publication Specialist at the University of Washington School of Law, for their assis-
tance, as well as Professor Joachim Henkel, Professor Lisa Manheim, and Professor Xuan-
Thao Nguyen for their invaluable comments on drafts of this paper. 
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Introduction 
On January 31, 2019, Elon Musk, the co-founder and CEO at Tesla 
Inc., announced that he had released all the carmaker’s patents and intended 
to share their patented inventions with anyone who wants to utilize the tech-
nologies to fight climate change.1 This is not the first time that Tesla has 
pledged to use patents for sharing their technologies: Tesla embraced an 
open source philosophy and made a public patent non-enforcement pledge 
in 2014.2 Tesla made this recent announcement to encourage more carmak-
ers to join their effort in electric car innovation by adding legal effect to 
their previously made pledge for those who are wary of liability.3 In the 
view of some observers, Tesla’s pledge has, in effect, destroyed the ra-
 1. “No Patent Suit Against People Who Use Our Tech in Good Faith”: Elon Musk,
NDTV (Feb. 2, 2019, 9:36 AM), https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/elon-musk-releases-all-
tesla-patents-to-help-save-the-earth-1986450. 
 2. Elon Musk, All Our Patent are Belong to You, TESLA (June 12, 2014), 
https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you. For a general discussion on Tesla’s 
pledge, see Serguei Netessine & Karan Girotra, Tesla Goes Big, Not Home, HARV. BUS. REV.
(June 17, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/06/tesla-goes-big-not-home.
 3. See Fred Lambert, A Number of Companies Are Now Using Tesla’s Open Source 
Patents and It Has Some Interesting Implications, ELECTREK (Nov. 10, 2015, 7:07 AM), 
https://electrek.co/2015/11/10/a-number-of-companies-are-now-using-teslas-open-source-
patents-and-it-has-some-interesting-implications/. 
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tionale for patents.4 This view is correct in the sense that Tesla’s actions de-
stroyed the outdated rationale for patents in the pre-Internet era. However, 
the pledge also demonstrates the need for a new rationale in the post-
Internet era—patents for sharing. It is unlikely that Tesla will stop obtaining 
patents because the company still needs patents in order to share their tech-
nologies and engage in open innovation. It will use patents defensively to 
avoid patent infringement litigation as well as proactively to advertise its 
technological expertise to prospective business partners and licensees 
through patent disclosures. 
Tesla is just one example of the current trend in high-tech industries to 
use intellectual property for sharing technologies. Microsoft has also an-
nounced its innovation initiative and shifted their innovation strategies to-
ward open source software (“OSS”) to take advantage of individual user in-
novators—in particular, programmers in the OSS community.5 The software 
giant also released its 60,000 patents to the OSS community by joining a 
defensive patent pool for protecting the OSS community from aggressive 
patent assertion.6
Industrialized economies across the globe are working together to bene-
fit from advanced manufacturing technologies made possible by machines, 
humans, and big data linked through the Internet. The revolution currently 
underway within the manufacturing industry in the post-Internet era is 
commonly referred to as “Industry 4.0.” Industry leaders and policymakers 
in Europe and Asia have adopted a number of initiatives under the moniker 
“Industry 4.0” to enhance the marriage between the physical and digital 
worlds, transforming the way products and processes are developed and 
commercialized. Emerging technologies in the post-Internet era have in-
creased the value of non-physical objects such as software and data com-
pared with physical objects such as machines and equipment.7 Firms and in-
dividuals no longer need to purchase and own tangible objects because 
intangible digital objects are easily shared. Thus, many of them prefer to ob-
tain a license to use the objects on a pay-by-time basis because doing so is 
cost-efficient. In the United States, this transformation of society resulting 
 4. Mike Masnick, Elon Musk Destroys the Rationale for Patents, Opens Up All of Tes-
la’s, TECHDIRT (June 12, 2014, 11:58 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/
11253427557/elon-musk-destroys-rationale-patents-opens-up-all-teslas.shtml. 
 5. Brad Smith, A New IP Strategy for a New Era of Shared Innovation, MICROSOFT
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2018/04/04/a-new-ip-strategy-for-a-new-era-
of-shared-innovation/; see also Kurt Mackie, Microsoft Outlines Its Open Source Software 
Shift, REDMOND MAG. (Sept. 17, 2018), https://redmondmag.com/articles/2018/09/17/
microsoft-outlines-open-source-shift.aspx. 
 6. Klint Finley, Microsoft Calls a Truce in the LINUX Patent Wars, WIRED (Oct. 11, 
2018, 7:33 PM)), https://www.wired.com/story/microsoft-calls-truce-in-linux-patent-wars/.
 7. See Intangible Assets Increase to 84% of S&P 500’s Value in 2015 Report, BUS.
INTANGIBLES LLC (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.businessintangibles.com/single-post/
2015/03/11/Intangible-Assets-Increase-to-84-of-the-SP-500s-Value-in-2015-Report. 
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from emerging technologies is frequently referred as the “information socie-
ty” or the “sharing economy.” 
The societal transformation brought on by emerging technologies in the 
post-Internet era has also removed the physical limitations of manufacturing 
plants and has significantly changed the way patents function. The majority 
of valuable goods in the post-Internet era are made up of complex technolo-
gies that include a large number of components and functions such as In-
formation and Communication Technologies (“ICT”).8 Such technologies 
result from open and highly distributed innovation networks including 
firms, universities, government agencies, and individual users. Each com-
ponent and function of a product in complex technologies is the result of 
cumulative innovation: the process of refinement and improvement of an 
existing idea by different innovators who obtain separate patents on their 
inventions throughout the process. The complex and cumulative nature of 
products in the post-Internet era leads to various overlapping patents being 
held by multiple patent owners. These phenomena are often referred as pa-
tent thickets.9 Firms in complex technologies are no longer able to manufac-
ture a product or provide a service without infringing patents held by others. 
Consequently, innovators such as Tesla have developed a new way to use 
the traditional patent framework—using patent rights to share technologies 
through no-enforcement pledges, cross-licenses, and other private ordering 
arrangements—to ensure the freedom to operate and innovate on their own 
inventions.10
Moreover, large producer firms that make profits by selling products 
and services are no longer the sole influential players in the innovation land-
scape. Through access to emerging technologies such as the Internet of 
Things (“IoT”) and Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), non-traditional innovators 
such as individual users can now assume a more important role in the de-
velopment and improvement of products and services. Individual users—in 
particular, programmers and members of the OSS community who embrace 
the open source philosophy—often promote innovation by sharing technol-
ogies. In the copyright context, the OSS community has retooled the exist-
ing copyright framework by developing open source licenses to stimulate 
collaboration. Large firms in complex technologies have reinforced this new 
use of the patent framework by sharing technology and collaborating with 
individual users to take advantage of their innovations. Even Microsoft, 
 8. Robert W. Rycroft & Don E. Kash, Innovation Policy for Complex Technologies,
16 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 73, 73 (1999). In 1995, complex technologies made up 82% of the 
most valuable world goods exports and the portion is expected to rise. 
 9. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 119 (2001). 
10. Cf. James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies
2 (Research on Innovation, Boston University School of Law, Working Paper No. 0401, 
2004), https://ideas.repec.org/p/roi/wpaper/0401.html. 
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once the greatest enemy of the OSS community, has called a truce by adopt-
ing the shared innovation initiative.11
Despite dramatic changes in the innovation landscape, the rationale for 
the patent system is still based on several assumptions rooted in the eight-
eenth century when the system was developed. Producer firms were the key 
players in the innovation process. These firms did not invent without any 
incentive and patents were used to exclude others and profits were made by 
selling products or services with supracompetitive prices. These firms dealt 
with products in the discrete technologies, i.e., technological sectors dealing 
with products that consist of few components and are covered by patents 
held by one patent owner who engages in the closed-innovation model. Pa-
tent scholars modernized this incentive theory as the prospect theory in an 
effort to give pioneer inventors the ability to control follow-on innovation 
through a broader scope of exclusivity on pioneer inventions. Neither the 
traditional nor modern incentive theories apply to many producer firms 
dealing in complex technologies. These firms inclusively use their patents to 
share technologies with others. Today, many inventors often prefer the free-
dom to operate over supracompetitive profit margins. 
Moreover, these incentive theories do not apply to individual user inno-
vators because individual users are satisfied with contributing to improve-
ments of products. Like firms in complex technologies, they are willing to 
invent and share their inventions with others without any additional profit 
motive.
This article discusses impacts of the innovation landscape transfor-
mation on innovative players and processes ushered in by the technological 
progress of the post-Internet era. It proposes a new utilitarian theory for pa-
tents in light of the new ways that patents are being used by firms in com-
plex technologies and OSS communities. Part I discusses the origin of the 
“Industry 4.0” concept, how technologies in the Industry 4.0 era have af-
fected society and innovation processes, and how the growing role of indi-
vidual user innovators has changed the way producer firms use patents and 
engage innovation. 
Part II reviews the traditional utilitarian theory for rationalizing the pa-
tent system. It further argues that the incentive to invent has become obso-
lete for many commercial firms in complex technologies because these 
firms engage in open innovation and need to share technologies with multi-
ple innovators in a more cumulative innovation process. Patents seldom 
provide the power to control such markets and no longer provide firms with 
profits through supracompetitive pricing. 
Part II also reviews modern theories focusing on incentives for com-
mercialization after invention—ex post incentive theories. Many ex post in-
centive theories are based on the prospect theory, which assumes a scope for 
 11. See Finley, supra note 6; Smith, supra note 5. 
98 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 26:93
commercialization and use of the patent beyond the original idea of the in-
ventor. The prospect theory has also become obsolete under current case 
law. Without coordination, multiple inventors engaged in cumulative inno-
vation are forced to develop ad-hoc collaboration mechanisms by using pa-
tents to share technologies. 
Part III proposes a new utilitarian theory: the incentive to share. In the 
post-Internet era, the patent system provides innovators with incentives to 
share their technology that rewards them with the freedom to operate and 
innovate. The current patent system fails to take into account the new use of 
patents in complex technologies and the unique motivation of individual us-
er innovators, in particular programmers in the OSS communities. Current 
patent policies are too producer-centric and largely apply to firms that en-
gage in closed innovation in the discrete technologies. Such firms are in the 
minority in the post-Internet era. 
Part IV reevaluates patent rights in light of the proposed new incentive 
to share theory. The Supreme Court recently gave Congress more flexibility 
to decide the content of patent rights, i.e., the exclusive and inclusive sides 
of patents as property rights.12 A review of U.S. history and other compara-
tive studies on the concept of property rights reveals that patent rights are 
two-sided rights: an exclusive side for excluding others and an inclusive 
side to ensure that patent owners can both practice and share their own in-
ventions. In the United States, the legal and political revolution at the turn 
of last century marginalized the inclusive side. In contrast, the inclusive side 
of patent rights under the German and Japanese Patent Acts guarantee pa-
tent owners the right to practice through compulsory licenses and share their 
patented inventions with others. The U.S. patent system can learn from 
these models to revitalize the inclusive side. Although their compulsory li-
censes are seldom exercised, German and Japanese innovators can use such 
licenses as a last resort if voluntary license negotiations fail, thus rewarding 
them with the freedom to operate and innovate. U.S. innovators cannot find 
such a resort even if patent owners who do not practice their patents and are 
not interested in sharing technologies make an unreasonable offer. Thus, 
this article argues for revitalizing the inclusive side of U.S. patent rights to 
provide innovators with an incentive to share. It proposes reform of the cur-
rent patent system by introducing a compulsory license for blocking patents, 
or limitations on infringement remedies as well as statutory exceptions for 
experimental and private uses. 
 12. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp.,
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018). 
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I.  Industry 4.0 and Its Impact on Innovation 
A. Industry 4.0 
In 2011, the German government launched an initiative called “Industry 
4.0” to promote and support digital manufacturing, research, intra-industry 
networking, and standardization.13 The German government defines “Indus-
try 4.0” as the intelligent networking of machines and processes for industry 
with the help of information and communication technologies.14 Three vi-
sionary German engineers organized a press conference to promote the no-
tion “Industry 4.0” in 2011.15 The campaign accelerated when a top execu-
tive at Siemens used the term Industry 4.0 to describe the Internet’s impact 
on manufacturing technology and products at the 2013 Hannover Messe.16
This led to the World Economic Forum’s adoption of the term as the main 
theme for the 2016 annual meeting.17 Now, under the concept of Industry 
4.0, many EU member states sponsor national initiatives to encourage high-
tech manufacturing.18
The “industry” in Industry 4.0 stems from the industrial revolution. The 
notion of “industrial revolution” was born in France to describe the techno-
logical breakthrough in manufacturing processes in England, marked by the 
proliferation of machines powered by water and steam.19 Since that seminal 
press conference in 2011, images showing the historical progress of the 
manufacturing industry—in four phases from the first industrial revolution 
 13. Demetrius Klitou et al., E.U. Commission, Germany: Industry 4.0, 3  
(Jan. 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/monitor/sites/default/files/
DTM_Industrie 4.0.pdf. 
 14. What is Industrie 4.0, PLATFORM INDUSTRIE 4.0, https://www.plattform-i40.de/
PI40/Navigation/EN/Industrie40/WhatIsIndustrie40/what-is-industrie40.html#:~:text=
Industrie%204.0%20refers%20to%20the,companies%20to%20use%20intelligent%20
networking (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). 
 15. Sabine Pfeiffer, The Vision of “Industrie 4.0” in the Making – a Case of Future 
Told, Tamed and Traded, 11 NANOETHICS 107 (2017). 
 16. Siegfried Russwurm, Member, Managing Board of Siemens AG, Press Conference 
Presentation at the Hannover Messe: Shaping the Future of Production with Siemens: On the 
Way to Industry 4.0 (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2013/
industry/2013-04-hannovermesse/presentation-russwurm-e.pdf.
 17. Pfeiffer, supra note 15, at 107. For additional discussion, see WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM, THE FUTURE OF JOBS: EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS AND WORKFORCE STRATEGY FOR THE 
FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_
of_Jobs.pdf. 
 18. Ron Davies, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing on Industry 4.0: 
Digitalisation for Productivity and Growth, 8, PE 568.337 (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568337/EPRS_BRI(2015)568337
_EN.pdf. 
 19. Emma A. Griffin, The ‘Industrial Revolution’: Interpretations from 1830 to the 
Present, in A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2010). 
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to the present—have become very popular among industry leaders and poli-
ticians to promote the motto “Industry 4.0.”20
As depicted in these images, the initial industrial revolution, otherwise 
known as Industry 1.0, began with the inventions of water- and steam-
powered manufacturing machines. Electrically powered manufacturing ma-
chinery enabled mass production and marked the start of Industry 2.0., or 
the second industrial revolution. With the development of the computer, 
many steps in the manufacturing process were automated by the use of pro-
grammable logic controllers and robots powered by electronics and ICT in 
the Industry 3.0 era. Consequently, machines replaced many human opera-
tors. Industry 4.0 is the era of Cyber Physical Systems (“CPS”), where hy-
perlinked manufacturing processes and related products are combined with 
AI and Big Data. Both Industry 3.0 and Industry 4.0 are based on the com-
puter and ICT, but Industry 4.0 is distinguished from Industry 3.0 by the in-
tensive use of networks connected through the Internet. Under Industry 4.0, 
computers and ICT enable autonomous manufacturing and optimum product 
performance without human intervention.21
In the United States, the notion of the “Information Society” has gained 
popularity to describe the phenomena resulting from digital information and 
communication technologies.22 Thus, the term “Information Society” in-
cludes economic, political, and cultural activities, and is not limited to phe-
nomena related to the industrial aspects of modern society. 
Japan, too, recently adopted “Connected Industries,” a concept similar 
to Industry 4.0. The “Connected Industries” initiative seeks to take ad-
vantage of technological innovations. It aims to add value and find solutions 
to societal problems by further connecting the various facets of modern life, 
including consumers, suppliers, companies, machines, and systems.23 The 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”) has adopted measures 
to stimulate technological development in five priority fields: automated 
driving and mobility services; biotechnology and materials; smart life; man-
 20. E.g. JOAQUÍN FUENTES-PILA ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR IMPROVING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY (IN AGRO-INDUSTRIES) 58, Fig. 32 (2015), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/303767337_Best_Practices_for_Improving_Energy_Efficiency_in_agro-
industries.
 21. Industry 4.0 combines various concepts of current industrial development, such as 
the IoT and smart factories and products. See GIZEM ERBOZ, HOW TO DEFINE INDUSTRY 4.0:
MAIN PILLARS OF INDUSTRY 4.0 (2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
326557388_How_To_Define_Industry_40_Main_Pillars_Of_Industry_40.
 22. JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3 (1986). 
23. Connected Industries, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/mono_info_service/connected_industries/index.html,
(last updated Apr. 10, 2019). 
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ufacturing; and plan-infrastructure safety management.24 The METI’s con-
cept is similar to Industry 4.0 in its focus on improving efficiencies and op-
timizing manufacturing processes. With the German government’s cam-
paign to develop international alliances, many of the ideas underlying 
Industry 4.0 have been adopted worldwide in China25 and Canada.26
B. Sharing Economy 
Industry 4.0 has had a significant impact not only on how products are 
produced, but also on how things are invented and innovated. In particular, 
the concept has changed the way in which companies deploy R&D re-
sources in innovation.27 Industry 4.0 connects both things and people 
through advanced high speed Internet; it enables different types of innova-
tors to share resources for research, manufacturing, and conducting busi-
ness.28 In particular, both small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) and 
individual innovators are able to share, exchange, and rent expensive R&D 
resources with the help of the Internet-supported technologies without the 
transfer of ownership.29 These practices are often referred to as the “Sharing 
Economy.” 
Sharing has become increasingly popular and is viewed positively by 
economists because it increases business efficiencies by reducing transac-
tion costs and maximizes the utilization of goods and services.30 Even large 
commercial firms hope to take advantage of the flexibility brought by In-
dustry 4.0 technologies. Many choose to rent R&D resources in an effort to 
avoid the large costs associated with purchasing and maintaining expensive 
equipment. 
 24. “CONNECTED INDUSTRIES” TOKYO INITIATIVE 2017, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY,
TRADE AND INDUSTRY (2017), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/pdf/1002_004b.pdf. 
 25. Jost Wübbeke & Björn Conrad, ‘Industrie 4.0’: Will German Technology Help 
China Catch Up with the West? CHINA MONITOR (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.merics.org/
sites/default/files/2017-09/China_Monitor_23_Industrie40_EN.pdf. 
 26. PIERRE-OLIVIER BÉDARD-MALTAIS, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CANADA,
INDUSTRY 4.0: THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION – ARE CANADIAN MANUFACTURERS 
READY? 2 (2017), https://bridgr.co/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/bdc-etude-manufacturing-
en.pdf. 
 27. In this article, a term “innovate” is used to include activities resulting in improve-
ments, which could either be patentable or not patentable. 
 28. For more discussion, see infra Section I.C.2. 
 29. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), SMEs are “non-subsidiary, independent firms which employ fewer than a given 
number of employees. This number varies across countries. The most frequent upper limit 
designating an SME is 250 employees, as in the European Union. However, some countries 
set the limit at 200 employees, while the United States considers SMEs to include firms with 
fewer than 500 employees.” OECD, SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP OUTLOOK: 2005 17, 
(Marian Murphy, ed., 2005). 
 30. See Araz Taeihagh, Crowdsourcing, Sharing Economies and Development, 33 J.
DEVELOPING SOC’Y 191, 192 (2017). 
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This paradigm shift also fostered the emergence of cloud computing 
services.31 Firms and businesses prefer the ease of pay-per-use flexibility, 
rather than large lump-sum payments for hardware—which often requires 
vast amounts of storage space—and the additional cost of employing engi-
neers to support the ever-changing hardware and software needs of a dy-
namic firm. Now that they can rely on the resources and services provided 
by computer specialists, firms no longer need to worry about the once-
necessary infrastructure required for the production of goods and services. 
Now, companies have access to a wide variety of software, as well as the 
ability to customize the software as needed. This flexibility and broad ac-
cess to resources has had the effect of democratizing the innovation process; 
non-traditional innovators such as individual consumers and users may now 
participate in the improvement of products and services by themselves.32
Another sharing community that enables non-traditional innovators to 
engage in innovation is a mechanism called “distributed computing,” which 
provides big R&D resources by utilizing multiple limited resources through 
Internet technologies.33 Distributed computing works by combining the 
power of several ordinary computers on a network to solve a problem in one 
second that would otherwise require the use of a more advanced computer.34
Individuals make their idle CPU time available to research projects for fur-
thering knowledge and assisting academic research such as improving cli-
mate prediction35 or protein structure predication.36
Universities and research institutions run many of these projects. By 
joining the projects, individuals have the ability to rival the computing ca-
pacity of large commercial firms such as Microsoft, Amazon and Google. 
They can participate in major research projects and contribute to the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts. In addition, with the birth of blockchain 
technologies that achieve consensus among participants, distributed compu-
 31. Cloud computing services give users access to a storage space in a high-speed 
computer and deliver various types of services via the Internet. For a general discussion on the 
social and economic impact of cloud computing, see generally Katsantonis Konstantinos et 
al., Cloud Computing and Economic Growth, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH PANHELLENIC 
CONFERENCE ON INFORMATICS 209 (2005). 
 32. For more discussion, see infra Section I.C.2; see also infra note 55. 
 33. For a general discussion of distributed computing system, see Krishna Nadiminti et 
al., Distributed Systems and Recent Innovations: Challenges and Benefits, 16 INFONET
MAGAZINE 1, 1 (2006), http://www.cloudbus.org/papers/InfoNet-Article06.pdf. 
 34. See Yochai Benker, “Sharing Nicely”: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of 
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 289 (2004). 
35. About, CLIMATEPREDICTION.NET, https://www.climateprediction.net/about/ (last 
updated May 20, 2019). 
 36. ROSSETTA@HOME, https://boinc.bakerlab.org/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) (“By 
simply running a free program, you can help advance research in medicine, clean energy, and 
materials science.”). 
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ting has been implemented in a wide variety of areas, not only in financial 
services like Bitcoin, but also anything that is believed to have some value.37
C. Distributed Innovation 
1. Open Innovation 
Through cloud computing and distributed computing, nontraditional in-
novators such as individual consumers and users can now participate in 
R&D projects that were previously limited to large firms in the pre-Industry 
4.0 era. These technologies enhance the innovation capacity of SMEs—
which are often the source of radical innovations—by providing access to 
resources that SMEs lack.38 A system involving various types of innovators 
who collaborate toward a common goal is defined as a distributed model of 
innovation and constitutes an advanced model of open innovation.39 The 
concept of “open innovation” comes from a book authored by a UC Berke-
ley’s business school professor, Henry Chesbrough.40 According to Profes-
sor Chesbrough’s own definition, open innovation is “the use of purposive 
inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and 
expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively.”41 He de-
scribes the activities as “a distributed innovation process based on purpos-
ively managed knowledge flows across organizational boundaries, using pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms in line with the organization’s 
 37. Bender Marr, 30+ Real Examples of Block Chain Technology in Practice, FORBES
(May 14, 2018, 1:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/14/30-real-
examples-of-blockchain-technology-in-practice/#17a4d1e3740d; Alex Pazaitis et al., Block-
chain and Value Systems in the Sharing Economy: The Illustrative Case of Backfeed, 125 
TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 105, 105-06 (2017) . 
 38. Antoine Pierre & Fernandez Anne-Sophie, Going Deeper into SMEs’ Innovation 
Capacity: An Empirical Exploration of Innovation Capacity Factors, 25 J. INNOVATION 
ECON. & MGMT. 139, 156 (2018). SMES are considered an important source of radical inno-
vations, particularly in science-driven sectors. OECD, PROMOTING INNOVATION IN 
ESTABLISHED SMES 3-6 (2018), https://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/ministerial/documents/2018-
SME-Ministerial-Conference-Parallel-Session-4.pdf. 
 39. See GARRY GABISON & ANNAROSA PESOLE, AN OVERVIEW OF MODELS OF 
DISTRIBUTED INNOVATION (2014), http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/
JRC93533/jrc93533_ap.pdf. 
 40. HENRY WILLIAM CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR 
CREATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (Harvard Univ. Press 2003). Systems of dis-
tributed innovation are coined with the concept of “business ecosystem.” Carliss Y. Baldwin, 
Organization Design for Distributed Innovation 1-3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 
12-100, 2012), https://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-100.pdf. 
 41. Henry William Chesbrough, Everything You Need to Know About Open Innova-
tion, FORBES (March 21, 2011, 1:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/henrychesbrough/
2011/03/21/everything-you-need-to-know-about-open-innovation/#313b99d775f4. 
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business model.”42 Chesbrough’s paradigm challenges the traditional verti-
cally integrated innovation model and instead calls on traditional innovators 
and commercial producer firms to share both knowledge and technology in 
a more distributed model.43
In the early twentieth century, closed innovation prevailed as the devel-
opment model. Closed innovation embraces exclusive control over all steps 
in the process of delivering an invention to market because all steps are per-
formed within each commercial producer firm that vertically integrates up-
stream through downstream stages of the value chain.44 In the closed inno-
vation model, a producers’ R&D investment is recouped through the sale of 
products and services with supracompetitive prices that are enabled by the 
patent monopoly.45
Chesbrough’s paradigm predates the publication of his book. One ex-
ample of the paradigm is the relationship between U.S. universities and 
commercial producer firms. For years, commercial producer firms received 
innovative technologies freely from universities. Prior to the enactment of 
the Bayh Dole Act in 1980, universities rarely sought patent protection for 
their inventions due to the lack of incentive to apply for patents because the 
federal government took ownership of patents issued to the universities.46
The Bayh Dole Act encourages universities to obtain patents for their inven-
tions and to engage in open innovation with commercial producer firms 
through technology transfer, thus increasing the incentive for commerciali-
zation.47 Commercial technology firms that received exclusive licenses for 
inventions developed by university researchers began to engage in cumula-
tive R&D in an effort to rapidly commercialize technologies.48 Such collab-
orative efforts with commercial firms led to a shift in universities’ attitudes 
towards patents, from passive observers to commercially aggressive patent 
assertion entities seeking to exclude others.49 Nevertheless, the custom of 
 42. Henry Chesbrough & Marcel Bogers, Explicating Open Innovation: Clarifying an 
Emerging Paradigm for Understanding Innovation, in NEW FRONTIERS IN OPEN INNOVATION
3, 17 (H. Chesbrough et al., eds., 2014). 
 43. GABISON & PESOLE, supra note 39, at 14. 
 44. CHESBROUGH, supra note 40, at 29; see also Natalie Rodet-Kroichvili et al., New 
Insights into Innovation: The Business Model Approach and Chesbrough’s Seminal Contribu-
tion to Open Innovation, 15 J. INNOVATION, ECON. & MGMT. 79, 82 (2014). 
 45. VON HIPPEL, FREE, infra note 55, at 7, 53. 
 46. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (1980). 
 47. Joel West, Does Appropriability Enable or Retard Open Innovation?, in OPEN
INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 109, 120 (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 
2006).
 48. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Re-
search & the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31, 34 (1991). 
 49. Peter Lee, Patents and University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 77-78 (2013). 
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sharing among academic research scientists still prevails, and universities 
seldom enforce patent exclusivity against other academic institutions.50
Oftentimes, highly distributed open innovation results in a component 
or function being covered by a number of patents held by different patent-
ees; this is because pioneer inventions are improved and commercialized 
successively by the cumulative process of multiple innovators.51 Such com-
ponents are typically combined with numerous other components in order to 
make products in complex technologies such as smartphones.52 As the com-
plexity of products increases, firms need to intensify their collaboration by 
learning, integrating, and applying knowledge from other firms.53 As will be 
discussed in Part II, firms that engage in open innovation use patents differ-
ently from those that practice closed innovation. This is especially true for 
firms in complex technologies.54 Patents provide such firms with an incen-
tive to share technologies, further promoting open innovation. 
2. User and Free Innovation 
In contrast to Chesbrough’s producer-focused innovation model, Eric 
von Hippel advanced the importance of roles played by non-traditional in-
novators. Specifically, he identified the part that users and individuals play 
in the innovation process.55 Von Hippel categorized firms and individual in-
novators in terms of the functional relationship with a given product: how 
innovators benefit from it.56 Innovators are considered users if they benefit 
from using products or services and are distinguishable from producers, 
whose benefit arises from making and selling products or services.57 He 
 50. Maria Teresita Barker, Patent Litigation Involving Colleges and Universities: An 
Analysis of Cases From 1980 – 2009 (Summer 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Iowa) (on file with the University of Iowa), https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.z1290gi7. For a dis-
cussion of the academic research science norm, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights 
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987). 
 51. For a discussion of cumulative innovation, see Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. 
Lakhani, “Open” Disclosure of Innovations, Incentives and Follow-On Reuse: Theory on 
Processes of Cumulative Innovation and a Field Experiment in Computational Biology, 44 
RES. POL’Y 4 (2015). 
 52. For a discussion of complex technologies, see Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting 
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Pa-
tent (or Not) 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w7552. 
 53. See Rycroft & Kash, supra note 8, at 2. 
 54. Justus Baron & Henry Delcamp, The Private and Social Value of Patents in Dis-
crete and Cumulative Innovation, 90 SCIENTOMETRICS 581, 583 (2011). For the discussion of 
a new use of patents for promoting open innovation, see infra Section II.C. 
55. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 102-105 (1988) [hereinafter 
VON HIPPEL, SOURCES]; ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 19-31 (2005) 
[hereinafter VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING]; ERIC VON HIPPEL, FREE INNOVATION 65-76 
(2017) [hereinafter VON HIPPEL, FREE]. 
 56. VON HIPPEL, SOURCES, supra note 55, at 3. 
 57. VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 55, at 3. 
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found that commercial and individual users, and not producers, account for 
much of the major product innovation in certain fields including complex 
technologies, such as semiconductor and printed board circuits.58 In particu-
lar, individual users have made significant improvements to products in the 
software and household sectors and are more willing to freely disclose them 
without patent protection.59
Von Hippel’s paradigm of user innovation predates recent develop-
ments in computer technology and the Internet. Long before the Internet, 
user firms were engaging in collaborative innovation and they continue to 
do so now.60 For example, as early as the mid-nineteenth century, firms in 
the iron industry in England’s Cleveland district were found to engage in 
“collective invention” to incrementally improve furnace technology.61
However, the advent of modern computers and the Internet in the Indus-
try 3.0 and 4.0 eras has underscored the importance of user innovation by 
enabling non-traditional innovators such as individual computer program-
mers to participate in the development of the OSS innovation model. The 
idea underlying the OSS innovation model was born in the 1980s led by a 
programmer at MIT’s AI Lab, Mr. Richard Stallman, who created a free op-
erating system called “GNU.”62 Mr. Stallman created the concept of 
copyleft—an idea to use copyright licenses to keep the source code for his 
software open, thereby securing the freedom of any user to copy or modify 
the software.63 His copyleft idea also took into account any derivative works 
that were developed based on his original software; the license required that 
any derivative works should be redistributed under the same conditions that 
governed the sharing of his original software.64 In 1989, Mr. Stallman draft-
ed and released the first version of the General Public License (“GNU 
GPL”), with provisions implementing the copyleft concept that effectively 
prevent derivative works from making their way into proprietary software. 
Many programmers shared Mr. Stallman’s philosophy, represented by the 
copyleft concept, and joined his efforts to improve the GNU software, lead-
ing to the creation of the Free Software Foundation. 
 58. See VON HIPPEL, SOURCES, supra note 55, at 3-4, 43-57. 
 59. VON HIPPEL, FREE, supra note 55, at 4-5, 19-35. 
 60. See VON HIPPEL, SOURCES, supra note 55, at 84. 
 61. Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 3-11 (1983). 
 62. David Bretthauer, Open Source Software: A History, PUBLISHED WORKS, 7, at 3-8 
(Dec. 16, 2001), http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/libr_pubs/7. 
 63. See, e.g., Christopher S. Brown, Copyleft, the Disguised Copyright: Why Legisla-
tive Reform is Superior to Copyleft Licenses, 78 UMKC L. REV. 749, 761 (2010). 
 64. The Copyleft idea can spread in proprietary software because any software com-
bined with copyleft licensed software is transformed to be distributed under a copyleft license. 
This extension of copyleft license to other software is called contamination. See generally
Copyleft and the GNU General Public License: A Comprehensive Tutorial and Guide,
COPYLEFT.ORG (2018), https://copyleft.org/guide/monolithic/. 
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Open source software is one of the best examples of an innovation 
model that is run by and for users without the involvement of commercial 
producer firms.65 Different groups of programmers from the OSS communi-
ty engage in transaction-free interaction, often bound by GPL or GPL-
inspired copyright licenses.66 One of the most successful examples is Linux. 
In 1991, Finnish student Linus Torvalds integrated GNU and released his 
original Linux software under GPL.67 Today, Linux is a family of operating 
systems based on the core computer program “Linux Kernel” and is bundled 
with a set of programs, tools, and services to provide necessary functionali-
ty.68 Not all the Linux-related programs are distributed under the GPL: some 
programs are distributed under BSD, Apache, and/or other GPL-inspired 
licenses that do not prevent programmers from creating proprietary soft-
ware.69 This inclusion of programs with less restrictive licenses makes the 
Linux system attractive to for-profit firms. Many large multinational com-
panies have joined the community and both sponsor the project financially 
and hire contributors to improve the Linux system.70
Many programmers who participate in OSS projects are individual us-
ers spread across the horizontal innovation network; they are connected 
through the Internet so that they can take advantage of innovations devel-
oped by others and, in turn, share their own innovations with others.71 Alt-
hough many technologies were developed by users in the pre-Industry 4.0 
eras,72 those users were mainly commercial firms with access to vast R&D 
resources.73 Due largely to the growing number of resources available via 
the Internet in the Industry 4.0 era, both individual users and consumers can 
independently or collaboratively participate in innovative processes across 
technological fields.74 Economists emphasize the importance of user innova-
 65. See Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from Open-
Source Software, 42 MASS. INST. TECH. SLOAN MGMT. REV. 82, 82 (2001); Eric von Hippel, 
Horizontal Innovation Networks - By and For Users, 16 INDUS. CORP. CHANGE 293, 293 
(2006) [hereinafter von Hippel, Horizontal]. 
 66. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Trans-
actions and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. CORP. CHANGE 155, 182 (2008). 
 67. What is Linux?, OPENSOURCE.COM, https://opensource.com/resources/linux (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 68. Id.; JONATHAN CORBET & GREG KROAH, 2017 LINUX KERNEL DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2 (2017), https://www.linuxfoundation.org/2017-linux-kernel-report-landing-page/. 
 69. Bretthauer, supra note 62, at 12. For BSD, Apache and other GNU inspired licens-
es, see ANDREW M. ST. LAURENT, UNDERSTANDING OPEN SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE 
LICENSING 14 (2004),. 
 70. CORBET & KROAH, supra note 68, at 14-15. 
 71. von Hippel, Horizontal, supra note 65, at 293-94. 
 72. See VON HIPPEL, SOURCES, supra note 55, at 19-25. 
 73. See David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and Technological 
Innovation, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 193, 210 (1996). 
 74. See generally Carliss Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm Shift: 
From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation, 22 ORG. SCI. 1399 
(2011); Eric von Hippel et al., Comparing Business and Household Sector Innovation in Con-
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tion, which increases social welfare by complementing producer innovation 
and removing inefficiencies.75 Traditional innovators, such as commercial 
producer firms, need two types of information: (1) a technical problem; and 
(2) a solution of the problem.76 The former is frequently held by users, while 
the latter is held by producers. This discrepancy often leads to high infor-
mation transfer costs.77 User innovation is effective at reducing information 
transfer costs, and consequently increases social welfare.78
User innovation also promotes commercial producer innovation be-
cause producers can take advantage of innovations disclosed by users with-
out payment of R&D cost for innovation.79 When producers are interested in 
open innovation, they start working with the users, leading to more open 
and collaborative innovation.80 SMEs and individual user innovators often 
disclose their innovations without any attempt to obtain patents because the 
cost of disclosing their innovation is less than the cost of enforcing the po-
tential benefit from either keeping it secret or obtaining patents and licens-
ing them.81 SMEs and individual user innovators can rarely afford to hire 
lawyers to manage confidential agreements or prosecute patents for their in-
ventions. In fact, licensing inventions can often generate less profit than the 
cost of securing and licensing patents and other types of intellectual proper-
ty.82
By making their innovated source code publicly available, individual 
programmers in the OSS community enjoy non-commercial benefits, such 
sumer Products: Findings from a Representative Survey in the United Kingdom, 58 MGMT.
SCI. 1669 (2012); Ruth Stock et al., Impacts of Hedonic and Utilitarian User Motives on the 
Innovativeness of User-Developed Solutions, 32 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 389 (2014); 
Ruth Stock et al., Impacts of Personality Traits on Consumer Innovation Success (2014), 45 
RES. POL’Y 757 (2016). 
 75. See, e.g., Joachim Henkel & Eric von Hippel, Welfare Implications of User Innova-
tion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 73, 73 (2005). 
 76. See Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Im-
plications for Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 429, 431-32 (1994). 
 77. See VON HIPPEL, SOURCES, supra note 55, at 7. 
 78. See Henkel & von Hippel, supra note 75 at 79. 
 79. See Dietmar Harhoff et al., Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How 
Users Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations, 32 RES. POL’Y 1753 (2003); VON 
HIPPEL, FREE, supra note 55, at 19-35. 
 80. See Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 74 at 1411. LEGO is one example of user-
producer open innovation. See Christoph Hienerth et al, Synergies Among Producer Firms, 
Lead Users, and User Communities: The Case of the LEGO Producer–User Ecosystem, 31 J.
PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 848 (2013). 
 81. See Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 74, at 1400-01. For empirical evidence on 
relative low licensing returns, see Charles W. L. Hill, Strategies for Exploiting Technological 
Innovations – When and When Not to License, 3 ORG. SCI., 428, 428-41 (1992); C. T.
TAYLOR & Z. A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF 
THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM (1973). 
 82. See Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 74, at 1401. 
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as improved reputation among peers83 and enhanced value as well as desira-
bility in the job market.84 Likewise, they are motivated by their own enjoy-
ment of learning and feeling creative, and often feel the need to give back to 
the communities because they, too, have received source code for free.85 It is 
unlikely that such programmers would suffer as a result of a free rider’s 
copying of source code.86 Even if a programmer were the first to develop 
source code and attempted to keep it secret, that disadvantage is unavoida-
ble, as another may develop and disclose the same or similar source code 
freely.87 Instead, individual programmers can increase the above benefits by 
distributing source code through free disclosure, rather than enforcing royal-
ty-bearing licenses.88
Even for large producer firms, the cost of securing and licensing patents 
is often significantly higher than the resulting benefit.89 Many large firms 
publish their inventions and innovations, foregoing any attempt for patent 
protection, in an effort to create prior art against future patent assertions.90
U.S. firms, the government, and individuals have widely adopted this defen-
sive publication practice, and submitted their inventions to the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for publication through the statu-
tory invention registration program.91 When the America Invents Act92 was 
 83. See generally ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON 
LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999). 
 84. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS.
ECON. 197, 213 (2003). 
 85. K. Lakhani & R. Wolf, Why Hackers do What They Do: Understanding Motivation 
and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN
SOURCE SOFTWARE 11 (J. Feller et al. eds., 2005); FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, Motives 
for Writing Free Software, https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fs-motives.en.html (last updated 
June 24, 2014). 
 86. See Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 85, at 15-16. 
 87. Karim R. Lakhani & Eric von Hippel, How Open Source Software Works: “Free” 
User-To-User Assistance, 32 RES. POL’Y 923, 923-24 (2003). 
 88. Harhoff et al., supra note 79, at 1759. 
 89. See Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defen-
sive Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical 
Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16-20, (2012). However, large firms may view pros-
ecution costs as insignificant when subsumed into the huge operation cost. See VON HIPPEL,
SOURCES, supra note 55, at 84. 
 90. Schultz & Urban, supra note 89, at 27. IBM used to run its own publication system, 
IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, but later joined other commercial firms and OSS founda-
tions to run a web site for defensive publications. Defensive Publications, OPEN INVENTION 
NETWORK LLC, http://www.defensivepublications.org/defensive-pubs-aboutus (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2019). 
 91. 35 U.S.C. § 157 (2006), repealed by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 103(e)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011); Wendell Ray Guffey, Statutory Invention 
Registration: Defensive Patentability, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 291 (1986). For statistics 
on the number of statutory invention registrations, see Number of Statutory Invention Regis-
trations and Defensive Publications Granted in the U.S. as of 2015, by Ownership, STATISTA
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enacted, the USPTO abolished the program on the assumption that the 
overwhelming majority of applications are published eighteen months from 
the effective filing date anyway.93
Even if patent protection is secured, many firms no longer use patents 
to bully competitors through injunctions and forced royalties.94 In complex 
technologies, firms use patents to share technology. Through cross-
licensing, companies obtain patents to increase opportunities to exchange 
technologies with competitors who might otherwise allege infringement 
against them.95
Another form of patent sharing is the (fair) reasonable and nondiscrimi-
natory (“(F)RAND”) license, an arrangement that producer firms in the tel-
ecommunication industry have developed. These firms pledge to license 
their standard essential patents under (F)RAND licenses when standard set-
ting organizations (“SSOs”) adopt standards.96 These pledges prevent stand-
ard essential patent owners from excluding not only SSO members, but also 
anyone who wishes to manufacture a product that is compatible with the 
standards.97 Some firms have developed a business model based on a patent 
sharing arrangement to protect customers from patent assertion entities 
(“PAEs”), i.e., firms that primarily acquire patents and seek to generate rev-
enue by asserting them against accused infringers,98 by developing a patent 
portfolio, licensing patents to customers, and procuring patents to prevent 
PAEs from obtaining patents.99 In these private ordering arrangements, pa-
(Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.statista.com/statistics/256647/statutory-invention-registrations-
defensive-publication-grants-by-the-uspto-by-ownership/. 
 92. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 93. See USPTO, STUDY AND REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEAHY-SMITH
AMERICA INVENTS ACT 32 (2015). 
 94. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 89, at 6. For patent bullies, see Colleen V. Chien, 
Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-
Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1588 (2009). 
 95. See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 10, at 1; Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedo-
nis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconduc-
tor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND. J. ECON. 101, 107 (2001) .For more discussion on the 
new use, see infra Section III. 
 96. Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, Patents and the Performance of Voluntary 
Standard-Setting Organizations 8 (June 2007), http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/documents/
published/ssopatents5.pdf.
 97. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012). For a discus-
sion of this case, see Jorge L. Contreras, From Private Ordering to Public Law: The Legal 
Frameworks Governing Standards Essential Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211 (2017); 
Kassandra Maldonado, Breaching RAND and Reaching for Reasonable: Microsoft v. 
Motorola and Standard-Essential Patent Litigation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 419, 422 
(2014).
 98. See FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 1 (2016). 
 99. See, e.g., James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
725, 752 (2015). 
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tent rights are used inclusively to provide access to patent technologies to 
other firms, patent owners, and licensees. As a result, patent owners, other 
firms, and licensees are rewarded with the freedom to operate should they 
themselves or their customers be charged with patent infringement. 
Even for firms that are willing to assert patent infringement to exclude 
others, recent changes in U.S. patent case law have significantly reduced the 
benefits of patent exclusivity. After the decision in eBay,100 the likelihood of 
obtaining an injunction is only 53% when the technology at issue in the liti-
gation relates to software.101 When such patents are owned by PAEs, the 
likelihood of success falls to 16%.102 Even for practicing entities, an injunc-
tion is not available unless the prevailing patentee can establish that mean-
ingful competition exists.103 Historically, various surveys have indicated that 
the value of patent rights to technology companies has typically not been 
very high, except for in the pharmaceutical industry, where patents remain a 
valuable asset.104 What is more, the falling success rate of injunctions since 
eBay has significantly reduced patent owners’ power to negotiate favorable 
royalty rates. 
Under the entire market value rule, courts may calculate a reasonable 
royalty based on the value of the entire product if a patentee can establish 
that the patented feature is the basis for customer demand.105 However, re-
cent case law has made clear that the entire market value rule is a narrow 
exception to the general rule that requires patent owners to calculate a rea-
sonable royalty based on the smallest saleable patent practicing unit.106 Case 
law has further clarified that a reasonable royalty must be based on the in-
cremental value that the patented feature adds to the entire product.107 The 
burden lies with the prevailing patent owner to apportion damages between 
the patented improvement and any conventional components when the in-
fringed patent covers only a part of a multicomponent product.108
 100. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
 101. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1985 (2016). 
 102. Id. at 1988. 
 103. See, e.g., Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Ams., Inc., 855 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2017).
 104. See Harhoff et al., supra note 79, at 1755; Alvin K. Klevorick et al., Appropriating
the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON.
ACTIVITY 783, 796 (1987). 
 105. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68-69 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 106. LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67. 
 107. Exmark Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods. Grp., LLC, 879 F.3d 1332, 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
108. Id.; Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A study also shows a significant decrease of the median 2016 award 
from 2015’s median award. PWC, 2017 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: CHANGE ON THE 
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In contrast to the considerable reduction of the financial benefit of pa-
tent exclusivity, the cost of securing patents has soared since the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of a rather uncertain standard for patent eligibility in Alice 
v. CLS Bank.109 Applications claiming software-related inventions are fre-
quently rejected for lack of eligibility and attorneys are spending an increas-
ing amount of time challenging USPTO decisions.110 The scope of claims in 
applications that manage to overcome USPTO rejections will likely be lim-
ited to a product or process including the algorithm disclosed in the specifi-
cation. Such claims are frequently found to describe the invention in func-
tional terms: An element of a claim for combination that is expressed in 
functional language without sufficient structural limitation will be construed 
to cover only the structure disclosed in the specification to perform the func-
tion recited in the claim and its equivalents.111 For software patents where 
the recited function is performed by a special purpose computer, the struc-
ture is an algorithm.112 When the scope is so narrow, competitors can easily 
circumvent the patent by creating a different algorithm that performs the 
same function.113
Some producer firms—SMEs that were founded by individual pro-
grammers, in particular—disclose their innovations free of patent exclusivi-
ty because they aspire to the same idealistic goal as the open source philos-
ophy: spreading free software and promoting cooperation in the OSS 
community through copyleft software development.114 It often makes sense 
for SMEs to join the OSS community in order to take advantage of the col-
HORIZON 9 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2017-
patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 109. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 215 (2014) (citing CLS 
Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring) (2013)) (re-
quiring something more or significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible subject matter 
or an inventive concept sufficient to make patent ineligible subject matter eligible). 
 110. Samuel Hayim & Kate Gaudry, Eligibility Rejections Are Appearing in Greater 
Frequency Across All Computer Related Technology Centers, IPWATCHDOG (May 24, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/24/eligibility-rejections-greater-frequency-uspto/id=
97615/; Mark Summerfield, New USPTO Data Set Reveals Extent of Patent-Eligibility Confu-
sion and Carnage, PATENTOLOGY (Dec. 4, 2017, 5:21 PM), https://blog.patentology.com.au/
2017/12/new-uspto-data-set-reveals-extent-of.html. 
 111. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012); Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012)). 
 112. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352; Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game 
Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 
F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 113. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent 
owner’s claims survived defendant’s eligibility-based validity challenge but were found not 
infringing because defendant adopted an algorithm different from the algorithm disclosed in 
the specification of the asserted patent). 
 114. See, e.g., RICHARD STALLMAN, Copyleft: Pragmatic Idealism, in FREE SOFTWARE,
FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 188 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002).
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lective innovation power that would otherwise be unattainable with their 
limited resources.115
The number of large producer firms who have joined the OSS commu-
nity is increasing. Such firms share source code and allow programmers to 
use their software for motives that differ from those of individual program-
mers and SMEs: monetizing OSS projects by developing business models 
for profit while remaining in compliance with restrictions set out by GPL 
and GPL-inspired licenses.116 Like SMEs, large producer firms also harness 
the power of the OSS community in order to expand their R&D resources 
and develop better products more quickly.117 Both SMEs and large firms can 
profit from innovations developed through OSS projects by selling compli-
mentary services such as training, technical support, etc.118 All types of 
firms can maximize their R&D capability by engaging in open-sourcing,119
using the OSS community as a platform for engaging users and improving 
products by removing user-reported bugs and modifying software to meet 
users’ general and unique needs.120 For firms that face the constant challenge 
of cost reduction and seek to be competitive in the global market, open-
sourcing is a better way of reducing R&D cost than outsourcing because it 
allows producer firms to retain and increase their R&D capability, while 
outsourcing research activities to other institutions may reduce such capabil-
ities in the long run.121 They also donate patents to the OSS community to 
minimize maintenance costs and trigger innovations that create new busi-
ness.122
In addition to these business-oriented motives, studies have shown that 
the idealistic goals of collective innovation and giving back to the OSS 
community also play a role in motivating producer firms to join the OSS 
community.123 A wide variety of types of commercial firms are particularly 
keen on participating in non-commercial patent pools that are developed to 
promote social welfare, such as improving global health and diffusing eco-
 115. See Andrea Bonaccorsi et al., Entry Strategies Under Competing Standards: Hy-
brid Business Models in the Open Source Software Industry, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1085 (2006). 
 116. See Morten Andersen-Gott et al., Why Do Commercial Companies Contribute to 
Open Source Software?, 32 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 106 (2012). 
 117. MICHAEL L. GEORGE ET AL., FAST INNOVATION: ACHIEVING SUPERIOR 
DIFFERENTIATION, SPEED TO MARKET, AND INCREASED PROFITABILITY 93, 98 (2005). 
 118. Andersen-Gott et al., supra note 116, at 113; Brian Fitzgerald, The Transformation 
of Open Source Software, 30 MIS Q. 587, 592-93 (2006). 
 119. Par J. Ågerfalk & Brian Fitzgerald, Outsourcing to an Unknown Workforce: Ex-
ploring Opensourcing as a Global Sourcing Strategy, 32 MIS Q. 385, 401-03 (2008); Ander-
sen-Gott et al., supra note 116, at 108. 
 120. Andersen-Gott et al., supra note 116, at 108-09. 
 121. Id. at 114. Regarding the drawback of outsourcing, see Gary P. Pisano & Willy C. 
Shih, Restoring American Competitiveness, 87 HARV. BUS. REV. at 116-20 (July-Aug. 2009).
 122. Nicole Ziegler et al., Why Do Firms Give Away Their Patents for Free?, 37 
WORLD PAT. INFO. 2, 5 (2014). 
 123. Andersen-Gott et al., supra note 116, at 113. 
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friendly technologies.124 These firms also leverage indirect benefits such as 
improving their reputation by making copyrights and patents publicly avail-
able free of charge.125
II. Review of Patent Theories 
Although technological developments in the Industry 4.0 era have sig-
nificantly changed the way commercial firms engage in innovation and in-
creased the role of individual users in innovation processes, U.S. courts con-
tinue to apply antiquated theories for rationalizing the patent system that 
were developed in the pre-Industry 4.0 era. In particular, the predominant 
rationale was developed in the Industry 1.0 era when individual inventor-
entrepreneurs, such as Thomas Edison and the Wright Brothers, invented 
the first electric light bulb and powered aircraft.126 Even in the Industry 2.0 
and 3.0 eras, large commercial firms played central roles in innovation be-
cause SMEs and individual user innovators had no or limited access to ma-
chinery, computers, and R&D resources.127 Many of these commercial firms 
were highly vertically integrated to maintain exclusive control over innova-
tion processes and the resulting products.128 Technological change encour-
aged commercial firms’ fragmentation, which led to more collaboration 
with SMEs and individual user innovators that implemented a highly dis-
tributed innovation process in complex technologies. These firms use cross-
licensing and other private ordering mechanisms to use patents for including 
others and sharing technologies instead of excluding others. 
A. Traditional Utilitarian Theory 
In the United States, utilitarianism is the dominant economic theory for 
justifying exclusive patent rights.129 The Copyright and Patent Clause of the 
 124. Ziegler et al., supra note 122 at 3. 
 125. Ågerfalk & Fitzgerald, supra note 119, at 592 (reporting that Apple’s reputation in 
the open source community has improved by starting its Darwin open source project); cf. Tim 
Smedley, Big Pharma Attempts to Cast Off Bad Reputation by Targeting the Poor, GUARDIAN
(June 25, 2015 8:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jun/25/
big-pharma-attempts-to-cast-off-bad-reputation-by-targeting-the-poor.
 126. Teece, supra note 73, at 210. 
 127. Id. (“[S]ince the last quarter of the 19th century and the emergence of R&D labs, 
and more recently venture capital, innovation has become more the domain of organizations, 
not individuals”). 
 128. Henry Chesbrough, A Better Way to Innovate, 87 HARV. BUS. REV. 12, 12 (2003). 
 129. There are philosophical justifications based on natural rights theories, including the 
labor theory by John Locke, the personhood theory by George Hegel, and the functional theo-
ry by Immanuel Kant. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (2011) [hereinafter MERGES, JUSTIFYING]; Robert P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2-3 (6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter 
MERGES, NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE]; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Proper-
ty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? 
Fall 2019] Patents for Sharing 115 
U.S. Constitution supports the theory by granting exclusive rights “to pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts.”130 U.S. courts and legal 
scholars have interpreted the clause to mean that Congress adopted the utili-
tarian theory to reward inventors with an exclusive right that will, in turn, 
provide incentives to invent.131 This inventor-centric reward theory was 
developed in the early stages of the industrial economy. This theory, how-
ever, has largely been rendered irrelevant by the information economy with 
the development of computing technologies in Industry 3.0 and the network 
information society in Industry 4.0.132 In the industrial economies of Indus-
try 1.0 and 2.0, inventors of pioneer inventions were awarded with the broad 
scope of patent protections covering their entire product and could start 
firms and exercise significant market power by being the exclusive seller of 
a product.133
As was intended by the founders of the U.S. patent system,134 inventor-
entrepreneurs could enjoy profits by selling their products or services with 
supracompetitive pricing during the temporary period of exclusivity to re-
The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 
(1990); see also Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. PUB. AFF., 31, 
31 (1989). 
 130. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Literature on the incentive theory published by U.S. 
economics and legal scholars is profuse. E.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003); Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–52 (2012); 
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004). 
 131. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (“The patent laws pro-
mote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive 
for their inventiveness and research efforts. The authority of Congress is exercised in the hope 
that ‘[the] productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the 
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emana-
tions by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.’”) (citations omitted); 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause em-
powering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative 
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”). 
 132. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 3 (2006), http://www.benkler.org/
Benkler_Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf. (“[W]e are seeing the emergence of a new stage in the 
information economy, which I call the ‘networked information economy.’ It is displacing the 
industrial information economy that typified information production from about the second 
half of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century.”). 
 133. For example, the Wright brothers obtained patent claims that covered the entire 
aircraft, thus granting the firm monopoly power. Carl Zollmann, Patent Rights in Aircraft, 11 
MARQ. L. REV. 216, 218-20 (1927). 
 134. Jefferson’s letter to his daughter reveals his intent to encourage U.S. inventors to 
invent and commercialize those inventions through the patent system. See DAVID KLINE, THE
INTANGIBLE ADVANTAGE: UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
ECONOMY 15 (2016); HENRY NOTHHAFT & DAVID KLINE, GREAT AGAIN: REVITALIZING
AMERICA’S ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP 71 (2011). 
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coup their investment in developing the products.135 This reward theory also 
presumes a closed innovation model; in the model, entrepreneurs invent, 
commercialize and market a new product during every stage of the value 
chain.136
Yet, this presumption no longer applies to the majority of commercial 
firms in the era of Industry 4.0. The ICT sector—at the very core of Industry 
4.0 technology—is classified as a complex technology because its products 
contain numerous components.137 Such technologies are characterized by 
overlapping, and thus mutually blocking, patents that cover each component 
and are held by different innovators, the result of highly distributed open 
innovation.138 Even if a piece of technology consists of one or very few 
components and is discrete, each component may have been covered by 
overlapping patents because it is likely that such components were the result 
of the cumulative innovation process based on generations of prior inven-
tions and were contributed by different innovators.139 The cumulative inno-
vation process is a dominant feature of technologies developed in the Indus-
try 3.0 and 4.0 eras, such as ICT, biotechnology, and other modern 
innovations.140 Through Germany’s Industry 4.0 initiative, the complex and 
cumulative nature of ICT has been spread through industry sectors of dis-
crete technologies where patent owners were once able to control their 
products. 
In complex technologies, firms do not enjoy exclusive control over their 
products. Because the technologies necessary to manufacture a product are 
frequently covered by a number of patents held by different parties, a patent 
owner can no longer produce a product without infringing patents held by 
others, making it impossible to develop products in the closed model with-
out the involvement of other firms.141 Standardized telecommunication tech-
nologies, which are essential for the enhancement of Industry 4.0, are good 
examples; 250,000 patents, declared essential for 2G, 3G, and 4G technolo-
 135. For the basic economics of patent protection and reward, see FRANÇOIS LÉVÊQUE 
& YANN MÉNIÈRE, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 20-42 (2004), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=642622.
 136. Teece, supra note 73, at 198 (“The ‘Schumpeterian’ view of the innovation pro-
cesses appears to be one that involves full integration, from research, development, manufac-
turing and marketing.”) For the Schumpeterian view, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT,
INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1934).
 137. Baron & Delcamp, supra note 54, at 583. 
 138. For more discussions on open innovation, see supra Section I.C.1. 
 139. See generally Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceuti-
cal Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001). 
 140. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Caus-
al Evidence from the Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317-18 (2015). 
 141. Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and 
Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT REV. 8, 9 (1997). 
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gies, were held by different patent owners.142 Components of such technolo-
gies are interdependent to ensure compatibility.143 As discussed in Part I, pa-
tent owners developed (F)RAND licenses to prevent others from excluding 
them and to share interdependent technologies with all prospective users to 
ensure sector-wide compatibility and the freedom to operate the technolo-
gies.144 Like multinational firms that protect programmers in the OSS com-
munities,145 many firms in the field of complex technologies use patents de-
fensively to develop a strong patent portfolio for cross-licensing with 
competitors and maintaining their own freedom of operation.146 In other 
words, these firms use their own patents as currency for cross-licensing in 
order to gain access to technologies that would otherwise be blocked by 
competitors’ patents. By obtaining access to the technology, firms are free 
to implement their own innovations into multi-component products.147
A study on patenting motivations also confirms the relatively high pri-
ority that commercial firms have for using patents defensively to ensure the 
freedom to operate. However, preventing imitation and hampering the com-
petition’s access to technologies are motives that ranked even higher.148 One 
recent study of German firms supports the proposition that imitation preven-
tion and defensive patenting are the leading reasons for firms in all sectors 
to seek patent protection.149 Even in chemical engineering, once classified as 
a discrete technology,150 the defensive motive is now ranked on par with the 
imitation prevention motive.151 This is further evidence of the impact of 
 142. TIM POHLMANN & KNUT BLIND, IPLYTICS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
LANDSCAPING STUDY ON STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 17 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/
growth/content/landscaping-study-standard-essential-patents-europe-0_en; Tim Pohlmann,
Industry Report – How To Count and Valuate Standard –Essential Patents, IAM (Nov. 15, 
2017), https://www.iam-media.com/how-count-and-valuate-standard-essential-patents. 
 143. Baron & Delcamp, supra note 54, at 582. 
 144. For the discussion of (F)RAND license, see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying 
text. 
 145. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. Regarding the open patent license 
used by these multinational firms, see infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. 
 146. William Kingston, Innovation Needs Patents Reform, 30 RES. POL’Y 403, 408 
(2001).
 147. Id.
 148. Gaétan de Rassenfosse et al., Motivations to Patent: Empirical Evidence from an 




 149. Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from Germany, 35 RES.
POL’Y 655, 663 (2006). 
 150. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY INDICATORS 181 (2011) [hereinafter WIPO]; Georg von Graeventz et al., Incidence 
and Growth of Patent Thickets: The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity,
61 J. INDUS. ECON. 521, 560 (2013). 
 151. Blind et al., supra note 149, at 664, 665 fig.4. 
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changes in the innovation process on motivation because imitation preven-
tion was once the dominant motive in such technology sectors.152 Pharma-
ceuticals, also once classified as discrete technologies,153 have become more 
cumulative in nature due to the increased number of patents on large mole-
cule drugs.154 As large molecules begin to play an important role in drug de-
velopment, drugs are no longer immune from the necessity to ensure access 
to patents held by biotechnology firms through defensive patenting strate-
gies.155
In short, throughout the core technological sectors in the Industry 4.0 
era, patents in practice do not give exclusive rights. It is essential that firms 
that deal with complex technologies engage in open innovation. Practically, 
such firms can no longer use patents for excluding others. Although com-
mercial firms secure patents when motivated by the desire to prevent imita-
tions by competitors, these patents frequently do not give firms sufficient 
power to prevent imitation if the firms are simultaneously infringing their 
competitors’ patents. The only firms that can easily enforce exclusivity in 
such technological sectors are PAEs, who do not practice patents and thus 
are immune from counter patent infringement assertion. The incentive to 
invent theory does not apply to PAEs anyway because many PAEs do not 
invent their patented technologies themselves; therefore, many view their 
enforcement of patent exclusivity as contrary to patent policy by diminish-
ing patent practicing firms’ incentive to invent.156
In addition, the incentive to invent theory does not apply to individual 
user innovators, who play an important role in open innovation. Indeed, in 
many cases they do not need or even dislike rewards provided by patent ex-
clusivity.157 Unlike producer firms that benefit from selling products and 
services, user innovators are self-rewarded by the benefit of developing and 
improving products and services. These benefits encourage not only indi-
vidual users but also commercial firms to disclose their inventions without 
 152. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1590, 1684-87 (2003) (Describing chemical and pharmaceutical industries as being spe-
cial by manufacturing a single product being covered by a single patent); Wesley M. Cohen et 
al., R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 
RES. POL’Y 1349, 1358 (2002). 
 153. WIPO, supra note 150, at 181; see also Michael Meurer, Patent Notice and Cumu-
lative Innovation, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
REGULATING INNOVATION 331, 332 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011). 
 154. See generally Lisa L. Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 299 (2010). 
 155. For the biotech firms’ responses to overlapping patents, see Shapiro, supra note 9, 
at 122-24. 
 156. FTC, supra note 98, at 24-25; see also Lauren Cohen et al., The Growing Problem 
of Patent Trolling, 352 SCIENCE 521, 521–22 (2016). 
 157. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine,
79 U. COLO. L. REV., 467, 485-87 (2008). 
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patent protection to allow others to use their inventions for which they have 
secured patents.158 The sharing philosophy is particularly important for OSS 
programmers, who have already adapted the copyright framework as a shar-
ing tool.159 To conclude, the incentive-to-invent theory was rational for pa-
tents in the Industry 1.0 era, but remains practical only for firms that engage 
in the closed-innovation model in the discrete technologies. 
B. Modern Utilitarian Theories 
Finding the traditional incentive to invent theory insufficient to support 
the current patent system, both legal and economics scholars have proposed 
numerous theories to explain how patents promote innovation following a 
break-through pioneer invention (follow-on innovation). However, these 
modified theories presume a reward from profits through exclusive control 
over their products and services. As discussed in connection with the incen-
tive-to-invent theory,160 this presumption does not apply to firms in complex 
technologies sectors. Complex technology firms have developed a new 
use—the defensive use of patents for sharing technologies. This new use is 
different from the use by firms in the sectors of discrete technologies that 
are the typical technological sectors of Industry 1.0.161
These modified theories are outdated in their failure to take account of 
the defensive use of patents. Moreover, these theories still focus on tradi-
tional innovators such as commercial producer firms and do not take into 
account the changes enabled by the technological advancement in Industry 
4.0: highly distributed open innovation in which commercial firms and indi-
vidual user innovators collaboratively engage. 
Economics scholars have long attempted to show the elasticity between 
patent grants and R&D investments, yet no empirical study has resulted in 
clear evidence supporting the connection.162 Similarly, no clear empirical 
evidence exists to show any positive impact on R&D investment from the 
change of patent policy through patent law revisions.163
Acknowledging the opportunity to develop a commercially viable tech-
nology as a prospect, one leading patent scholar, Edmund Kitch, developed 
 158. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text. 
 161. See Luigi Orsenigo & Valerio Sterzi, Comparative Study of the Use of Patents in 
Different Industries, (Knowledge, Internationalization & Tech. Stud., Universita’ Bocconi 
Working Paper No. 033, 2010), https://ideas.repec.org/p/cri/cespri/kites33_wp.html. 
 162. See Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Research Investments?, 28 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23088, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23088. 
 163. See Josh Lerner, The Empirical Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Innova-
tion: Puzzles and Clues, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 343 (2009); Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstet-
ter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1998 Japanese Patent 
Law Reforms, 32 RAND J. ECON., 77 (2001). 
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the prospect theory, arguing that a patent grant with a broad exclusive scope 
on a pioneering invention results in positive impacts on downstream inven-
tions; the pioneer patent owner can coordinate investments in follow-on in-
novation that falls within the broad scope.164 The prospect theory is more in 
line with innovation by commercial firms in the Industry 4.0 era than the 
incentive-to-invent theory in that it acknowledges the cumulative nature of 
innovation and the necessity for managing resources among follow-on in-
novators.165
A number of economics scholars have also examined the impact of pio-
neer patents on follow-on innovation, but none of their studies has been able 
to clearly support a significant link between the two. In response to criti-
cisms of Kitch’s prospect theory,166 Green and Scotchmer have used a theo-
retical model that showed no negative impact on follow-on innovation re-
sulting from patents on pioneer inventions, so long as the exclusive rights 
on pioneer inventions encourage the execution of correct licensing between 
the pioneer patent owner and follow-on innovators.167 Other scholars have 
challenged Green and Scotchmer’s conclusion by showing negative impacts 
from patenting pioneer inventions when pioneer patent owners block fol-
low-on innovation and proper licensing fails to occur.168 Another recent 
study has shown that the negative impacts of blocking patents are limited to 
very specific circumstances.169 Other empirical studies confirm that there is 
no impact or only a marginal one on follow-on innovations.170 However, 
whether patent grants affect pioneer inventions is still unclear because other 
studies show significant impacts on follow-on innovation.171
These studies have influenced patent scholars who have attempted to re-
fine the prospect theory to explain the role of the patent system in light of its 
constitutional goal—the promotion of the useful arts. For some economics 
scholars, an invention leads to technical innovation only if the invention is 
 164. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 266 (1977). 
 165. Id. at 276. 
 166. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842 (1990) (arguing pioneer patenting’s negative impact on 
follow-on innovation by taxing or impeding their activities). 
 167. See Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit In Sequential 
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 22 (1995). 
 168. See James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40
RAND J. ECON. 611, 612-613 (2009; Albert Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent Thickets, 
Courts and the Market for Innovation, 41 RAND J. ECON. 472 (2010). 
 169. See Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 168, at 18. 
 170. Jean-Noel Barrot & David Colino, Patent Duration and Cumulative Innovation: 
Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment 22-23 (2017), https://economics.mit.edu/
files/12937.
 171. Fabian Gaessler et al., Patents and Cumulative Innovation – Evidence from Post-
Grant Patent Oppositions, 2017 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 4. 
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commercialized.172 Commercialization is “the process of moving a technol-
ogy or innovative concept from the idea state to the market place;” such a 
process involves a great deal of challenges that firms must overcome in or-
der to deliver a product that meets the needs of a particular market at an af-
fordable price.173 A variety of studies have demonstrated the advantages of 
the open innovation model for overcoming these challenges.174 The prospect 
theory assumes that these challenges arise after invention and is distin-
guished from the traditional incentive to invent theory in focusing on ex post
improvement and commercialization activities instead of ex ante invention 
activities.175 The prospect theory also takes into account the fact that ex post
activities—also known as follow-on innovations—are more likely to be en-
gaged by innovators other than the innovators of pioneer inventions. The 
theory is thus more in line with the idea of open innovation than the incen-
tive to invent theory, which assumes that ex post activities are engaged in by 
innovators of pioneer inventions in the closed innovation model. 
The prospect theory attracted a lot of attention from patent scholars, 
which has led to various proposed modifications that revise the traditional 
ex ante incentive theory to extend to ex post incentive for commercializa-
tion.176 Some of the ex post incentive theorists enhanced the prospect theory 
by proposing that patents be granted earlier,177 while others proposed the ex-
tension of patent terms in order to encourage commercialization activities.178
Others proposed a variety of reforms on the current patent system for in-
creasing the ex post incentive including reform proposals that reward com-
mercialization separately from inventions.179 Several critiques were made to 
 172. CHRIS FREEMAN & LUC SOETE, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 6
(3rd ed. 1997). 
 173. Reza Bandarian, Evaluation of Commercial Potential of a New Technology at the 
Early State of Development with Fuzzy Logic, 2 J. TECH. MGMT. & INNOVATION 73, 74 
(2007).
 174. Joel West & Marcel Bogers, Leveraging External Sources of Innovation: A Review 
of Research on Open Innovation, 31 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 814, 814-15 (2014). 
 175. Lemley, supra note 130, at 138-39. 
 176. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. Rev. 697, 707-08 (2001) (property right is necessary for facilitating investment 
for commercialization of nascent inventions); Ted M. Sichelman, Commercializing Patents,
62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 374-75 (2010) (“In sum, economic rationale for patent protection for 
ex ante inventive efforts arguably applies with similar force for ex post commercialization 
efforts.”). 
 177. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 471-72 (2004). 
 178. See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2007). 
 179. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 120 (2009) (analogizing patents to real options and arguing to require applicants to 
reduce their inventions to practice before or after filing a patent application); Camilla Alexan-
dra Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 13 (2015); Sichelman, supra 
note 176, at 396; see also Abramowicz, supra note 178, at 1106; Michael Abramowicz & 
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such reform proposals that sought to add a reward for commercialization. 
For example, one patent scholar argued that no separate incentive for com-
mercialization is necessary. This is because the rewards from selling prod-
ucts are assumed to include all justification for patenting. This assumption 
does not apply to the university technology transfer context, where patent 
exclusivity was not an incentive to invent or disclose for inventors in the ac-
ademic setting.180
Although the ex post incentive theory modernized the ex ante theory by 
taking account of the ideas of cumulative and open innovation, the current 
U.S. patent system seldom provides a prospect function because current 
case law has eliminated one important feature of the patent system: the pa-
tent scope beyond what is entitled as reward for a disclosed invention.181 The 
Federal Circuit limited the scope of patent claims to what the inventor actu-
ally invented and intended to envelop in the claims.182 For the overwhelming 
majority of patents, their scope is limited to what the inventor disclosed as 
his or her invention and thus does not extend to follow-on innovation as lit-
eral infringement. A patent’s scope may reach to follow-on innovation as 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, because courts may find 
equivalence even if an element is replaced with an after-arising technolo-
gy.183 However, recent Federal Circuit case law has made the doctrine of 
equivalents a narrow exception.184 Patent scholars view the doctrine as a 
dead letter.185 Moreover, even if courts find that follow-on innovations in-
fringe the original patent, post-eBay case law prevents a patent owner from 
excluding follow-on infringers if the infringers are not the patent owner’s 
own competitors or if the owners broadly and extensively license their in-
ventions for commercialization.186 In short, patent owners seldom have the 
John Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 344 
(2008); Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127, 
1128 (2009).
 180. Katherine J. Strandburg, Users, Patents and Innovation Policy, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 725, 737 (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Justine Pila, 
eds., 2018). 
 181. Kitch, supra note 164, at 267. 
 182. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. 
 183. Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising Technologies” and Tailoring Patent 
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 151 (2005); Chung-Lun Shen, Patent Infringement 
and Reasonable Allowance of New Technologies in Claim Construction, 25 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 293-94 (2015). 
 184. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 960 (2007); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1157 
(2004); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1177 (2011). 
 185. Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 379 
(2012).
 186. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns., Inc., 694 F.3d 1312 (2012). 
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power to control follow-on innovation in order to coordinate improvements 
and commercialization activities. 
In addition, patent owners of pioneer inventions have little power over 
follow-on innovation when follow-on innovators obtain separate patents on 
their improvements, because the exclusive rights of pioneer and improve-
ment patents necessarily block patent owners from practicing their own in-
ventions.187 Critics of prospect theory have made the point that this aspect of 
the U.S. patent system is inconsistent with the theory.188 The premise of the 
prospect theory does not apply to cases where separate, overlapping patents 
are granted on each component because such patents further diminish the 
ability of patent owners in complex technologies to control follow-on inno-
vation.189 Without any mechanism to control follow-on innovation, pioneer 
patent owners cannot make profits through follow-on patent owners’ sales 
of products resulting from their commercialization. Thus, the lack of a con-
trol mechanism may discourage patent owners from obtaining patents early. 
However, patent owners in complex technologies continue to obtain patents 
early because they use patents for sharing technologies and promoting open 
innovation. 
Ex post theories that focus on commercialization do not apply to most 
user innovators, especially OSS programmers, because these inventors in-
novate on products and services and deliver them directly to other users 
(peer-to-peer diffusion). Not only is the ex post incentive for IP rights un-
necessary to invent, but the practices based on this incentive are frequently 
avoided due to the prohibitively high transactional cost of acquiring and li-
censing IP rights.190 OSS programmers use IP rights for ex post activities on-
ly when a transaction-free mechanism to share technology is developed, 
similar to the mechanism developed as copyleft in the copyright context.191
In sum, modern utilitarian theories are inadequate for rationalizing the pa-
tent system in the Industry 4.0 technological age because they fail to explain 
the role of the patent system in complex technologies. 
III. NEW Utilitarian Theory 
In light of the new uses of patents in complex technologies, this article 
proposes a new utilitarian theory for rationalizing the patent system: the in-
centive to share. The patent system should reward inventors with the free-
 187. For more discussions about blocking patents, see infra notes 229-30, 263 and ac-
companying text. 
 188. Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Com-
petition, 5 RES. L. & ECON. 193, 205 (1983); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improve-
ment in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1047 (1997). 
 189. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 190. VON HIPPEL, FREE, supra note 55, at 6. 
 191. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
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dom to operate and innovate on their inventions by providing incentives to 
share technologies. In the ICT sector, such incentives are given by retooling 
patent rights through open patent licenses to share technologies and promote 
collaboration between producer firms and OSS programmers.192 In other 
words, the patent system should promote innovation by the diffusion of 
technological ideas through different innovators.193
The ex ante and ex post incentive theories are flawed because of the 
current patent system’s producer-centric Industry 1.0 era policy, which as-
sumes that all innovators maintain a closed innovation model and receive 
incentives only through profits from exclusively selling products and ser-
vices.194 In other words, patent policy should be modernized to take into ac-
count the new use of patents in complex technologies so that the patent 
grant might give innovators who engage in open innovation an incentive to 
share their inventions with prospective innovators by revitalizing the inclu-
sive side of patent rights.195 The exclusive side of patent rights, too, should 
be reevaluated in an effort to give prospective innovators the ability to oper-
ate and innovate on already-patented inventions.196
Current patent policy has yet to reflect the modern uses of the patent 
monopoly because the new use and the expansion of open innovation are 
relatively recent phenomena. Large firms, including those in complex tech-
nologies such as ICT, have historically been vertically integrated and have 
engaged in a relatively closed innovation model until the end of last centu-
ry.197 The technological advances that occurred in Industry 3.0 and 4.0 en-
hanced open innovation because such advances have made it possible for 
smaller, more specialized firms to compete with large firms in innovation, 
which has led to large firms’ disintegration and modulation and their col-
laboration with small firms to expand open innovation.198
With an incentive to share, patents can reduce high transaction and 
search costs, which are a major concern for Coasian economics scholars.199
With complex technologies, where innovation is highly distributed, firms 
often need to use many patents held by others. The new use of patents, i.e.,
 192. For a discussion of open patent licenses, see infra notes 208-12 and accompanying 
text. 
 193. Collen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law,
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 846 (2016). 
 194. VON HIPPEL, Free, supra note 55, at 14. 
 195. See discussions infra Section IV.B. 
 196. See discussions infra Section IV.C. 
 197. Jens Frøslev Christensen, Withering Core Competency for the Large Corporation 
in an Open Innovation World?, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 35-
61 (H. Chesbrough, W. Vanhaverbeke & J. West eds., 2006). 
 198. Id. at 43. 
 199. Edward J. Egan & David J. Teece, Untangling the Patent Thicket Literature 13, 18 
(Tusher Center for Management of Intellectual Capital, Working Paper No. 7, 2015), 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/untangling-patent-thicket-literature/. 
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the defensive use of patents for sharing, can reduce such cost by cross-
licensing with patents held by others.200 Technological advancements in the 
modern era have intensified the complex nature of products and services in 
all technological sectors because the Internet connects things and people 
with AI and big data, thus rendering the operation of such products and ser-
vices interdependent.201 Because this interdependency makes the scope of a 
freedom to operate search unreasonably broad and expensive, firms must 
limit the scope to balance the cost and risk.202 As a result, firms that conduct 
a thorough freedom to operate search may still infringe patents held by oth-
ers if the patents are directed to a technology unrelated to the field of inven-
tion that they plan to practice. Instead of conducting an expensive search, 
firms in complex technologies use their patents as a trading currency to 
cross-license with patents held by a party that might otherwise assert patent 
infringement.203 Such firms also develop a large patent portfolio to deter 
others from asserting patent infringement.204
Moreover, firms in complex technologies have enhanced the new use of 
patents by retooling patent rights for sharing technologies through a variety 
of open patent licenses.205 These open patent licenses share two common 
features: (1) using patents to share technologies with other members and de-
fend against patent infringement assertions; and (2) using standard public 
licenses to minimize transaction costs. Among such licenses, the defensive 
patent license (“DPL”) was developed to address the needs of the OSS 
community and was strongly influenced by its philosophical underpinnings: 
openness and the freedom to operate and innovate.206 By joining the DPL, a 
patent owner (including a potential patent owner) gives all other DPL mem-
bers a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive license to other members with 
respect to their technologies in the entire and future patent portfolio.207 An-
other arrangement that uses patents to share technology is the license offer 
 200. See id. at 14. 
 201. For technology interdependence, see Diane E. Bailey et al., Minding the Gaps: Un-
derstanding Technology Interdependence and Coordination in Knowledge Work, 21 ORG.
SCi. 713, 714 (2010). 
 202. Gillian Fenton, Application of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Principles to 
Patent Freedom to Operate (FTO) Analysis: A Novel ‘IP-RM’ System, 51 LES NOUVELLES – 
J. LICENSING EXEC. SOC’Y 246, 248 (2016). 
 203. Kingston, supra note 146, at 408. 
 204. Corbel & Le Bas, infra note 216, at 11. 
 205. Natacha Estèves, Open Models for Patents: Giving Patents a New Lease on Life, 21 
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 2, 8 (2018). 
 206. Schultz & Urban, supra note 89, at 52; THE DEFENSIVE PATENT LICENSE, Preface,
https://defensivepatentlicense.org/license (last accessed Nov. 21, 2018). 
 207. THE DEFENSIVE PACT LICENSE, supra note 206, at License Grant. According to the 
preface, anyone can join the DPL community by making a commitment to be bound by the 
license terms when she obtains a patent in the future. Id. at Preface. 
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made under the creative common public patent license.208 Once an offer is 
publicized online, anyone can accept the offer on a non-discriminatory basis 
without any further negotiation, although the license may include a license 
fee or royalty.209
Producer firms developed several open patent licenses with the particu-
lar aim of collaboration with programmers in the OSS community. In the 
Linux context, for example, the Open Invention Network (“OIN”) is a pa-
tent pool for sharing technologies owned by their members: Patent owners 
join OIN and let it grant royalty-free worldwide non-exclusive licenses to 
other members in exchange for licenses to use other members’ patents. 210
Large commercial firms such as IBM, Google, Philips, Toyota, and most 
recently Microsoft have all joined the OIN and donated their patents.211
Members of the OSS community also run an initiative to use patents for 
protecting programmers; the Mozilla Foundation—an OSS group that de-
veloped the web browser “Firefox”—obtains patents and gives a royalty-
free worldwide non-exclusive license to programmers in exchange for a li-
cense with the same conditions for the programmers’ own patents.212
Tesla and other producer firms in the complex technology fields have 
made pledges to limit the enforcement of their patents.213 These firms usual-
ly list their patents and make public commitments to grant licenses either 
with or without a royalty payment, or pledge not to assert their patent 
rights.214 These pledges are good examples of mechanisms for using patents 
to share technologies. One drawback is that the enforceability of these 
pledges depends on principles of equity and is thus uncertain.215 Neverthe-
less, the ultimate effect of these pledges is the same as open patent licenses 
if they are enforced — sharing and giving access to patented technologies. 
Patents play a proactive role in promoting open innovation by facilitat-
ing the sharing of technology by innovators.216 At present, producer firms 
208. See Model Patent License, CREATIVE COMMONS,
https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Model_Patent_License (last updated Oct. 19, 2010, 
5:29 PM). 
 209. Id.
 210. OIN License Agreement, Section 1. License, OPENINVENTIONNETWORK
https://www.openinventionnetwork.com/joining-oin/oin-license-agreement/ (last visited Nov. 
1, 2019). 
 211. See id. at Members, https://www.openinventionnetwork.com/about-us/members/ 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019). 
 212. Mozilla Open Software Patent License Agreement v1.1, MOZILLA,
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/policy/patents/license/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 213. Jorge L. Contreras, The Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, at 1, 3 (Ctr. for Int’l 
Governance Innovation Papers No. 166, 2018). 
 214. Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 555-57 (2015). 
 215. Contreras, supra note 213, at 4. 
 216. Pascal Corbel & Christian Le Bas, The Evolution of Patent Functions: New Trends, 
Main Challenges and Implications for Firm Strategy 12 (Groupe D’Analyse et de Théorie 
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work with a variety of partners including customers, suppliers, competitors, 
and other complementary partners. Improvements are discovered through 
external sources or are outsourced, and commercialization is achieved 
through multiple innovation models.217 Some firms actively seek out exter-
nal information about their inventions so that they can effectively commer-
cialize them.218 Other firms may not have sufficient complementary assets 
for commercialization and need to find partners to supplement assets that 
the firm may lack and commercialize their inventions so they can enjoy 
large profits from products or services sold in the open marketplace.219 Pa-
tents facilitate interactions between firms who want innovation sources and 
those who want to collaborate or outsource the commercialization of their 
own.220
Through patent disclosures, patent owners can advertise and demon-
strate their technological information and expertise to prospective partners 
and licensees.221 This signaling effect is particularly important for technolo-
gy startups seeking to facilitate access to external funding.222 Patents articu-
lately describe technological information as a property right through the 
function of patent claims, which reduces transaction costs for both technol-
ogy licensing contracts and joint venture contracts.223 Patents also encourage 
innovators to engage in discussions about technological information with 
Économique, Working Paper No. 1106, 2011), https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-
00569239/document. 
 217. Marcel Bogers & Joel West, Contrasting Innovation Creation and Commercializa-
tion within Open, User and Cumulative Innovation, (July 13, 2010) (working paper), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1751025. 
 218. Keld Laursen & Ammon Salter, Open for Innovation: The Role of Openness in Ex-
plaining Innovation Performance Among U.K. Manufacturing Firms, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 131, 131 (2006). 
 219. David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integra-
tion, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 285 (1986) (demon-
strating that for innovators to receive profits from commercialization, they must have com-
plementary assets). 
 220. Patrick Cohendet & Jurien Pénin, Patents to Exclude v. Include: Rethinking the 
Management of Intellectual Property Rights in a Knowledge Based Economy, TECH.
INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 12 (2011); Deepak Hegde & Hong Luo, Patent Publication and 
the Market for Ideas, 64 MGMT. SCI. 652, 652 (2018) (discussing the benefits of patent disclo-
sure, including the reduction of information costs between sellers and buyers of technological 
information through the publication of an invention in a credible, standardized, and central-
ized repository). 
 221. Chien, supra note 193, at 805; Cohendet & Pénin, supra note 220, at 13; Jay P. 
Kesan, Economic Rationales for the Patent System in Current Context, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 897, 911-12 (2015). 
 222. Joan Farre-Mensa et al., What Is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent 
‘Lottery’ 5 (USPTO, Economic Working Paper No. 2015-5, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
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potential partners by reducing the risk of free-riders appropriating the inven-
tion.224
In short, innovators of complex technologies use patents for including 
others and sharing technologies in open innovation instead of excluding 
others. They have developed cross-licensing, patent non-enforcement 
pledges, and other imaginative arrangements by using their patents as rights 
to practice and share a patented invention. However, these private ordering 
arrangements cannot work to give PAEs the incentive to share. As will be 
discussed in the next section, the current patent system should be reformed 
so that patents on follow-on inventions would effectively require blocking 
prior patent owners, giving a license to the patent owners of the follow-on 
inventions. 
IV. Reevaluation of Patent Rights 
A. Patents as Property Rights 
Adapting the patent system based on the incentive to share theory for 
accommodating the needs of new innovators and innovation models in the 
era of Industry 4.0 will inevitably lead to the reevaluation of the fundamen-
tal concepts of the current patent system. Because the review of firms’ in-
novation activities reveals that many patents on complex technologies are 
no longer used for excluding others, it also makes sense to question the 
well-established feature of patent rights as property rights. 
Congress, in the U.S. Patent Act, and Courts, in interpretations of that 
Act as well as the Constitution, have both confirmed the nature of patents as 
property rights.225 It is a well-established rule that patents primarily give the 
right to exclude others.226 The Federal Circuit has emphasized this funda-
mental nature by stating that it is “elementary” that “a patent grants only the 
right to exclude others and confers no right on its holder to make, use, or 
 224. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS (H. M. Groves ed., 1962), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf. See generally 
James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the 
Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190 (1994); Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 
Entrepreneurs and New Ideas, 39 RAND J. ECON. 1105 (2008); Chien, supra note 193, at 
835.
 225. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp.,
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018) (“Patents convey only a specific form of property right—a 
public franchise.”). 
 226. See Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S.Ct. at 1369 (stating that the Court “recognize[s] 
patent rights as the ‘private property of the patentee.’”); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 
152, at 1597-99 (“[C]ourts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent 
law is utilitarian . . . . Agreement on basic utilitarian goals has not, however, translated into 
agreement on how to implement them.”).
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sell” the invention.227 U.S. legal scholars take it as true, citing blocking pa-
tents as an example.228 The patent owner of a pioneer invention may block 
the patent owner of an improvement invention by refusing to give a license 
to practice the pioneer invention that covers the improvement literally or 
equivalently, while the same patent owner is prevented from practicing the 
improvement within the scope of the pioneer invention because of the ex-
clusive right of the subsequent improvement patent.229 For the patent owner 
of the improvement to practice the invention, the U.S. Patent Act relies on a 
voluntary patentee-infringer bargain between the patent owners, which oc-
casionally fails to occur.230
In contrast, patent systems in many European and Asian countries, in-
cluding Germany and Japan, give a patent owner not only the right to ex-
clude others but also a right to practice her invention by including a provi-
sion for compulsory licenses in the case of blocking patents.231 Both German 
and Japanese Patent Acts (“the Acts”) clearly provide that the effect of a pa-
tent is to give the patent owner a right to practice the patented invention.232
Both Acts also give the patent owner a right to exclude others from using 
the patented invention because the Acts make clear that the right to practice 
the invention is exclusive to the patent owner.233
The Japanese Patent Act expressly provides that a patent owner may 
grant an exclusive or non-exclusive license to practice the patented inven-
tion.234 The German Patent Act provides that any rights deriving from the 
 227. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 879 n.4 
(Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 228. E.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[1] (explaining, under sec-
tion heading “The Right to Exclude Others” that patents secure only the right to exclude and 
then discussing blocking patents by way of illustration); Kieff, supra note 176, at 719 n.102. 
 229. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2222 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, Solicitude]; see also
Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Block-
ing Patents, 62 TENN. L. Rev. 75, 80 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Bargaining Breakdown].
 230. Merges, Bargaining Breakdown, supra note 229, at 78. 
 231. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL I] at 1, § 24, as amended, Oct. 8, 2017, 3546, art. 4 (Ger.); Tokkyoh  [Patent Act], 
Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 72, 92 (Japan); see also Merges, Bargaining Breakdown, supra
note 229, at 104. 
 232. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], at 1, § 9, (Ger.) (“The patent shall have the effect 
that the proprietor of the patent alone shall be entitled to use the patented invention within the 
scope of the law in force.”). For the positive right to use a patented invention, see PATENT 
LAW: A HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN AND GERMAN PATENT LAW 733 (M. W. Haedicke & H. 
Timmann eds., 2014); Tokkyoh  [Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 68 (Japan) (“A pa-
tentee shall have the exclusive right to work the patented invention as a business.”). 
 233. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], at 1, § 9, (Ger.); Tokkyoh  [Patent Act], Law No. 
121 of 1959, art. 68 (Japan). 
 234. Tokkyoh  [Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 77-78, translated in (Japanese 
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patent, such as a license, are transferable, and the Act presupposes the pow-
er to grant a license by allowing either a patent owner or her licensee to reg-
ister their exclusive license.235 In short, these countries define a patent right 
positively and affirmatively; patents are viewed as a two-sided right – one 
side is to exclude others (exclusive side) and the other side is to practice the 
patented invention and include others through a license (inclusive side) – 
because of their nature as property rights in parallel to all other types of 
property rights under the German and Japanese legal systems.236 The U.S. 
Patent Act once inherited the two-sided right through the conceptual devel-
opment based on property right doctrines; however, the legal and political 
revolution at the turn of the twentieth century eliminated the inclusive side 
of patent rights.237
European scholarship on property helpfully rethinks patents as property 
rights and could be used to revitalize the inclusive side of U.S. patents. Eu-
ropean legal scholars have acknowledged the inclusive side of patent rights 
and some have proposed reinventing patent rights as inclusive rights by fo-
cusing on the incentive to share technologies through licenses.238 For exam-
ple, in her proposal of a second-tier patent system, Geertrui von Overwalle 
stripped the exclusive side of patent rights and enhanced the inclusive side 
by defining a patent as “a temporary permit to exploit monopoly rights un-
der fair and reasonable conditions, investing technology owners with the au-
thority to invent and share.”239 Under this definition, patents give patent 
owners a right to execute licenses to encourage sharing behaviors without 
the right to request injunction for infringement.240 Her reinvention of patent 
 235. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL I] at 1, § 15, 31, as amended, Oct. 8, 2017, 3546, art. 4 (Ger.). 
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in KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 250 (P. Drahos et al. eds., 2015). 
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L. REv. 953 (2007) (discussing history of U.S. intellectual property law). 
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sivity to Inclusivity, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 258, 281 
(Helena Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013) [hereinafter Dusollier, Commons]; Séverine 
Dusollier, Inclusivity in Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENERAL 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES – IS IP A LEX SPECIALS? 101, 103 (Graeme Dinwood-
ie ed., 2015) [hereinafter Dusollier, Inclusivity in Property I]; Overwalle, supra note 236, at 
29.
 239. Overwalle, supra note 236, at 30; see also Geertrui Van Overwalle, Smart Innova-
tion and Inclusive Patents for Sustainable Food and Health Care: Redefining the Europe 
2020 Objectives, in CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ACHIEVEMENTS 
AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 231 (Cristophe Geiger ed., 2013); Geertrui Van Overwalle, Turning 
Patent Swords into Shares, 330 SCIENCE 1630, 1631 (2010). 
 240. Overwalle, supra note 236, at 251. 
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rights revitalizes the patent system by enhancing the inclusive side of patent 
rights while substantive patent examination is being eliminated. Her pro-
posed regime addresses the needs of both commercial firms in complex 
technologies and individual users who engage in open innovation through a 
combination of property rights and contract, as has been done by the OSS 
community.241
Another European scholar, Séverine Dusollier, has proposed another in-
terpretation of property rights focusing on the inclusive side of intellectual 
property rights such as copyrights and patents.242 She identifies two distinc-
tive features of using property inclusively: “(1) the absence of a power to 
exclude others, which leads to inclusion of others in the use (‘me and oth-
ers’); and (2) the collectiveness of uses (‘me with others’), in contrast to the 
feature of exclusive use of property that is defined by exclusion (‘only me 
and not you’) and individuality (‘solely’).”243 Her definition of the features 
of property rights encompasses the important concept of a property right 
even without exclusivity; it is in stark contrast to a definition focusing on 
the exclusive side that may result in a no-content or empty right once exclu-
sivity is removed. The concept under Dusollier’s definition is a right owned 
in common by multiple parties who can share the use the subject matter of 
the property right.244 With respect to intellectual property rights, such shar-
ing may result from: (1) an absence of exclusivity through falling into the 
public domain or through limitations/exceptions; (2) a reversion through a 
license or no enforcement pledge; or (3) a denial through courts’ refusal to 
grant an injunction.245 She has re-conceptualized intellectual property rights 
with an emphasis on the public domain and other mechanisms to encourage 
collective use and the sharing of property rights, and has urged policymak-
ers to create regimes wherein both the exclusive and inclusive sides of prop-
erty rights are used to promote new types of innovation.246
U.S. scholars have also acknowledged the inclusive side of patent 
rights: Robert Merges has described the post-grant stage of intellectual 
property rights as “bound up with various forms of inclusion” by citing ex-
amples of non-enforcement and waiver.247 Further, he has observed the im-
 241. Id. at 206, 277 (proposing a hybrid, public-private constructed, semi-codified re-
gime and citing OSS licensing as an example). 
 242. See Dusollier, Commons, supra note 238, at 279-81; see also Séverine Dusollier, 
Inclusivity in Property 5 (Global and Emile Noel Fellow Forum, October 10, 
2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Severine%20Dusollier%
20-%20Oct%2010%20forum.pdf [hereinafter Dusollier, Inclusivity in Property II].
 243. Dusollier, Inclusivity in Property I, supra note 238, at 105. 
 244. See Dusollier, Commons, supra note 238, at 262. 
 245. Dusollier, Inclusivity in Property I, supra note 238, at 105-15. 
 246. Id. at 117. 
 247. See MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note, 129, at 295 (emphasis omitted); see also
Sichelman, supra note 176, at 406 (acknowledging “positive rights” in his proposal for com-
mercialization patents). 
132 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 26:93
portant role played by individual users and programmers and commented 
that “[d]iscrete works, originating from and belonging to an individual or 
small creative team, are decidedly yesterday’s news. These works, and the 
property rights associated with them, will for the most part just wither away 
in the future.”248
Yochai Benkler identified the inclusive side of property rights as a 
“commons” and found that the inclusive side is indispensable for the prop-
erty system to function.249 He explained “commons” in light of the symmet-
rically-privileged freedom and commented on the central role played by 
commons in the current information-and-open-innovation-central economy 
as complementing the traditional “property” that asymmetrically allocates 
rights to control resources.250 Another U.S. scholar, Colleen Chien, also ar-
gues for the use of patents inclusively through pledges, waivers, and con-
tracts to share patents.251
This article embraces the above views advanced by these U.S. and Eu-
ropean scholars in recognizing patents as two-sided rights. Post-eBay, case 
law has stripped the exclusive side of patent rights from U.S. patent owners 
when any of four equitable factors set forth by the Supreme Court is not es-
tablished.252 However, patents are not worthless for lack of the availability 
of injunctions for patent owners. Commercial firms still file patent applica-
tions and obtain patents because of the inclusive side of patent rights: the 
right to practice and share a patented invention. In other words, the inclusive 
side gives patent owners the power to execute a contract: an open patent li-
cense. Such open patent licenses authorize others to practice the patented 
invention and impose an obligation on others to grant back a license on im-
provements to the patent owners or anyone specified in the contract.253 For 
many commercial firms that engage in open innovation, in particular firms 
in complex technologies, the exclusive side of patent rights is not only use-
less but is also harmful to their reputation and to their work with innovators 
who subscribe to the open source philosophy. Thus, many of them voluntar-
ily renounce their exclusive patent rights through open patent licenses and 
pledges. 
B. Inclusive Side of Patents 
Adam Mossoff has urged U.S. scholars and lawyers to rediscover the 
inclusive side of patent rights by comparing property and patent theory side-
 248. MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 129, at 294. 
 249. Yochai Benkler, Between Spanish Huertas and the Open Road: A Tale of Two 
Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 3-4 (B. M. Frischmann et al., eds., 2014). 
 250. Id. at 19. 
 251. See Chien, supra note 193, at 840-45. 
 252. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text. 
 253. Overwalle, supra note 236, at 227-29 (inclusive patent proposed by author has only 
a one-sided right to conclude licenses to establish sharing behavior). 
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by-side.254 Although Mossoff’s argument is based on historical and philo-
sophical perspectives, this article argues for the rediscovery of the inclusive 
side of patents in light of the incentive-to-share theory. The exclusive and 
inclusive sides of patent rights should be well-balanced so as to be neutral to 
those who engage in both open and closed innovations, as well as to various 
types of innovators. As will be discussed, the exclusive side should be 
weakened or limited through introduction of a compulsory license or limita-
tion to infringement remedies while enhancing the inclusive side for patent 
owners who engage open innovation to guarantee their freedom to operate 
and share technologies. 
The current patent policies’ overemphasis on the exclusive side has en-
couraged PAEs’ aggressive patent assertions and the development of prac-
ticing patent owners’ private ordering mechanisms through voluntary con-
tracts to defend such assertions. The mechanism gives firms that practice 
their patents and sell products the incentive to share their technologies with 
competitors to get access to competitors’ technologies through cross-
licenses. In contrast, these private ordering mechanisms cannot make pa-
tents to give PAEs the incentive to share because they are not interested in 
getting access to others’ technologies and executing voluntary contracts to 
share technologies. Thus, this article calls for a public law mechanism, i.e.,
patent law reform. Such reform is very timely because a recent case, Oil
State, gave Congress an opportunity to reevaluate the nature of patent rights 
and revitalize the inclusive side of the property dichotomy. In its opinion, 
the Supreme Court endorsed the power of Congress to reevaluate the exclu-
sive and inclusive sides of patent rights as public franchises.255
The current one-sided patent protection is inconsistent with the funda-
mental principle of promoting the progress of useful arts for failing to take 
into account the new defensive and proactive uses of patents that have de-
veloped in complex technologies – the core technologies of Industry 4.0. 
The rationales of the traditional incentive theories fail in many technological 
sectors because the theories are based on an unrealistic assumption of the 
patent owner’s market control.256 In other words, the current patent rights 
were structured with the franchise for enhancing closed innovations. Patent 
rights should be reevaluated to be consistent with the franchise for enhanc-
ing open innovations, considering all types of innovators and their respec-
tive uses of patents, with special regard to firms in complex technologies 
and user-innovators who use patents for sharing their innovations.257
 254. Mossoff, Exclusion, supra note 237, at 325-26. 
 255. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1375 (2018). 
 256. See David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, On “Patent Monopolies”: An Economic 
Re-Appraisal, ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2017, at 2 (2017). 
 257. VON HIPPEL, FREE, supra note 55, at 3-10. 
134 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 26:93
Because these new innovators in complex technologies cannot enjoy 
sales profits with supracompetitive prices, they should instead be rewarded 
with the freedom to operate and innovate. To ensure this freedom, the inclu-
sive side of patent rights must be enhanced through the introduction of a 
mechanism that guarantees patent owners the right to practice and improve 
their inventions. Germany, Japan, and many other countries have guaranteed 
such a right through compulsory licenses.258
The U.S. patent system does not provide a compulsory license. The lack 
of the license is predicated on the assumption that the patent owners of prior 
inventions and those who own patents for follow-on inventions should be 
able to reach an agreement that is mutually beneficial.259 Any such bargain 
can only occur if the follow-on invention adds significant value to the prior 
invention, and will bear a sufficient profit for the owner of the prior inven-
tion. To guarantee a fair bargain for both parties, TRIPS requires that fol-
low-on inventions involve an important technical advance of considerable 
economic significance from the prior invention.260 Thus, the patent owner of 
the follow-on invention should have bargaining leverage through her patent 
exclusivity, even if she is unable to practice the follow-on invention without 
a license from the pioneer patent owner.261 In addition, high litigation costs 
encourage both patent owners to reach an agreement. As well exemplified 
by patent owners in complex technologies, most patent owners prefer a roy-
alty-free cross license or a Mexican Standoff, i.e., multiple infringers inde-
pendently decide not to sue each other, to avoid the high transaction cost of 
royalty calculation and litigation.262
However, such an assumption under standard economic theory may not, 
in reality, happen because of the difficulty of estimating profits from the fol-
low-on invention and the inherently unequal bargaining power between pri-
or and follow-on patent owners.263 Patent owners tend to undervalue other 
patent owners’ inventions, which often prevents patent owners from reach-
ing an agreement.264 Moreover, this assumption does not apply to a bargain 
between PAEs that do not practice their patents and a follow-on patent own-
er that practices its patents. Regardless of the economic significance of fol-
low-on inventions, PAEs would not be interested in royalty-free cross-
 258. Merges, Bargaining Breakdown, supra note 229, at 105; see also supra notes 231-
36 and accompanying text. 
 259. See Merges, Bargaining Breakdown, supra note 229, at 77-78. 
 260. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31(i), Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33, I.L.M. 1197 (1994). Almost all UN member states including US, the EU 
member states, and Japan are signatories of TRIPS and are under obligations to meet the 
minimum standards for IP protection set forth in TRIPS. 
 261. Merges & Nelson, supra note 166, at 862. 
 262. Egan & Teece, supra note 199, at 14. 
 263. Merges, Bargaining Breakdown, supra note 229, at 89. 
 264. Id. at 89-90. 
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licensing or any discount on royalty rates. The failure to reach a cross-
licensing agreement between prior and follow-on patent owners has the po-
tential to significantly delay commercialization of new technologies, and 
creates a significant loss to the general welfare.265 Other countries’ patent 
systems are better balanced between the inclusive and exclusive sides, and 
the recognition of the inclusive side guarantees patent owners the right to 
practice their inventions. In other words, the current U.S. patent system 
benefits only firms that use patents for excluding others, particularly PAEs 
that do not practice patents over those that practice and improve their inven-
tions to promote useful arts. 
Despite the numerous benefits for innovators who use patents for shar-
ing instead of excluding, it is likely that enhancing the inclusive side of U.S. 
patents and introducing a compulsory license will face challenges. The 
American patent system disfavors any compulsory license that allows courts 
– instead of the parties – to set license terms because the invention valuation 
problem is often exacerbated by the fact that judges often lack technology-
specific knowledge and are not well versed in industry licensing practices or 
norms.266 However, the eBay decision rendered this problem moot by requir-
ing courts to calculate reasonable royalties for future infringement (the on-
going royalty) if courts decline to award an injunction and allow the adjudi-
cated infringer to continue to practice the invention.267 There is disagreement 
among U.S. legal scholars as to whether judicial unwillingness to enforce 
the exclusive side of patent rights operates as a de facto compulsory li-
cense.268 The high degree of knowledge necessary for judges to valuate 
complex inventions has further exacerbated the difficult situation in which 
patentees find themselves. Judges should be able to handle a royalty calcula-
tion for a compulsory license if they can calculate an ongoing royalty based 
 265. See id. at 87. 
 266. F. M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING
47-48 (Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber eds., 1977). 
 267. E.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Sichelman, supra note 176, at 407 (citing eBay for supporting the 
positive right that assures using his proposed commercialization patents without undue inter-
ference from blocking patents). 
 268. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R43266, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF 
PATENTED INVENTIONS 8 (2013) (distinguishing the judicial unwillingness from the compul-
sory license as the former applies to any entity that meets the statutory requirement whereas 
the latter applies to the specific adjudicated entity). Compare Christopher A. Cotropia, Com-
pulsory Licensing under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the United States Decision in eBay 
v. MercExchange, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY 557, 573 (Toshiko Takenaka & R. Mouf-
ang, eds., 2008) (acknowledging that judicial unwillingness created a de facto compulsory 
license) with Paul M. Janicke, Implementing the ‘Adequate Remedy at Law’ for Ongoing Pa-
tent Infringement After eBay v. MercExchange, 51 IDEA: INTELL PROP. L. REV. 163, 176 
(2011) (recognizing the judicial unwillingness as a compulsory license and arguing that courts 
have no authority to grant a compulsory license). 
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on projected future sales because both calculations require a certain degree 
of speculation.269
In particular, U.S. patent owners disfavor drug compulsory licenses be-
cause they are known, historically, as a mechanism for introducing patented 
drugs in developing countries with a lower price than the preferred su-
pracompetitive price to which the patentee is entitled.270 However, an empir-
ical study shows otherwise; the prices set by compulsory licenses are often 
lower than the price resulting from international procurement, which is the 
current alternative.271 Moreover, U.S. patent owners are suspicious about the 
risk of bias because non-U.S. judges decide the price and compensation. No 
such risk is involved under the compulsory license system that this article 
proposes because U.S. judges would decide the reasonable compensation in 
a manner similar to the ongoing royalty adopted in cases since eBay.
One might argue that a compulsory license is not necessary if judicial 
unwillingness to award injunctions already functions as a de facto compul-
sory license. Yet, compulsory licenses are preferable to the judicial unwill-
ingness to award injunctions because it encourages ex ante patent transac-
tions instead of ex post transactions. The 2011 U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission’s patent law and competition policy intersection report empha-
sized the benefits of ex ante patent transactions through licenses before 
adopting a technology, which is in stark contrast to the detrimental and am-
biguous effects of ex post transactions, which can lead to negotiation and 
litigation after the adoption of a technology without a license and, thus, in-
fringement.272 The ex post patent transaction can distort competition in tech-
nology markets and may deter innovation through the risk that patent hold-
ers may seek a higher royalty than the rate that would have resulted from an 
ex ante transaction.273 A compulsory license encourages ex ante patent 
transactions and provides an incentive to owners of follow-on inventions to 
approach the owner of prior inventions because of the expectation that they 
will be granted a compulsory license if they do not reach an agreement on 
royalties. In Germany, the patent owners of follow-on inventions can file an 
action with the Federal Patent Court to request a grant of compulsory li-
 269. Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV.
695, 700 (2011). 
 270. John M. Wechkin, Drug Price Regulation and Compulsory Licensing for Pharma-
ceutical Patents: The New Zealand Connection, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 237, 238-
43 (1995). 
 271. Reed F. Beall et al., Compulsory Licensing Often Did Not Produce Lower Prices 
for Antiretrovirals Compared to International Procurement, 34 HEALTH AFF. 493, 493 
(2015).
 272. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE-ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 9, 40 (2011). 
 273. Id. at 50. 
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cense.274 In Japan, such a request can be filed with the Japan Patent Office 
(“JPO”) so that the commissioner grants a license.275 In the United States, 
district courts should decide the request to grant a compulsory license as 
these courts grant an ongoing license. Patent owners can resort to the com-
pulsory licenses only if the patent owners of follow-on inventions asked for 
licenses from the patent owners of the prior inventions and were unable to 
reach an agreement on the grant of license. These countries’ experiences 
with compulsory license regimes suggest that the threat of compulsory li-
censes also encourages patent owners of prior inventions to reach an agree-
ment with those who own the patents on the improvements.276
Another frequently raised argument against a compulsory license is that 
it weakens the economic incentive to invent.277 As discussed above, the in-
centive to invent theory is obsolete for many patent owners in complex 
technologies in light of the lack of control and market power, as well as the 
way these firms engage in innovation in the era of Industry 4.0.278 Patent 
owners in the discrete technologies who engage in closed innovation may 
want to continue to exclude others and oppose any type of compulsory li-
cense but such industrial sectors have become the minority as a result of the 
spread of open innovation and the IoT. Moreover, studies by economics 
scholars do not clearly support the proposition that a diminished incentive to 
invent has an impact on actual innovation activities.279 Even if there is any 
impact, such impact is expected to be very marginal.280 In any event, post-
eBay case law has already created a change that should result in an impact 
on innovation activities. Nevertheless, innovation has decidedly not ended. 
Alternatively, a mechanism to guarantee patent owners the right to 
practice their patented inventions could be defined as a limitation on reme-
dies for certain types of infringement.281 I am proposing a revision that ac-
complishes the same effect as a grant of a compulsory license by limiting 
remedies—allowing a patent owner to obtain only a remedy of a reasonable 
royalty in case of infringement.282 Even if follow-on patent owners had 
knowledge that their practice of the inventions covered by the prior patents 
constituted infringement, no enhanced damages should be available to pun-
 274. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL I] at 1, § 24(1), as amended, Oct. 8, 2017, at 3546, art. 4 (Ger.). 
 275. Tokkyoh , [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, art. 92, para. 3 (Japan). 
 276. Merges, Bargaining Breakdown, supra note 229, at 105. 
 277. E.g., Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unrea-
sonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 297 (1994). 
 278. See discussion in Part II.A. 
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ish a follow-on inventor who previously sought a license.283 This definition 
of the inclusive side of patent rights—as a denial of injunction instead of a 
grant of license—is more in line with remedies presently available under 
post-eBay case law. 
The proposed compulsory license and remedy limitation are designed to 
limit the negative effects that PAEs have had on the US patent system. Un-
der the proposed framework, patent owners of follow-on inventions are 
awarded with the freedom to operate only if their follow-on inventions in-
volve an important technical advance of considerable economic significance 
in comparison with the technical advance of the prior invention claimed in 
the prior patent, as required by TRIPS.284 A valid separate patent on a fol-
low-on invention should give rise to a presumption of the required technical 
advance. Thus, patent owners may continue to prevent imitations that are 
not separately patentable. The economic significance and benefits resulting 
from the avoidance of litigation cost should give the owner of prior patents 
the incentive to share their technologies to reach a voluntary cross-license 
agreement. If both patent owners are practicing entities, it is likely that such 
a cross-license leads to portfolio licensing. 
Such a voluntary bargain should fail to happen (1) if a follow-on inven-
tion does not, in fact, involve the required technical advance or (2) the 
blocking prior patent owner is a PAE and is not interested in practicing any 
patent regardless of any technical advance. Because prior patent owners fre-
quently undervalue follow-on inventions held by others, they bear the bur-
den of overcoming the presumption by establishing the lack of the required 
technical advance. In making a comparison, the technical advance of the 
prior invention should be discounted if the prior patent is not practiced at all 
and is thus a paper patent; paper patents are of less value to the public than 
practiced patents.285 In particular, if the blocking patent is owned by a litiga-
tion PAE that never practices any of their inventions and settles with royal-
ties less than the lower bound to avoid infringement litigation costs, their 
patents only have nuisance value.286 As a result, prior patent owners can 
avoid a compulsory license or remedy limitation if they do not undervalue 
follow-on inventions: in fact, the follow-on inventions lack the required 
technical advance. In contrast, non-practicing patent owners, in particular, 
litigation PAEs, will find it difficult to avoid the compulsory license or rem-
 283. Id. In some cases, courts enhanced on-going damages due to willful infringement. 
J. Gregory, Sidak, Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP.L.J.
161, 175 (2016). 
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U.N.T.S. 299, 33, I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
 285. John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 
1360 (2013). 
 286. FTC, supra note 98, at 43. 
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edy limitation and will be forced to share their technologies with follow-on 
patent owners. 
C. Exclusive Side of Patents 
The exclusive side of U.S. patent rights should also be reevaluated in 
light of the incentive to share theory to guarantee innovators a right to oper-
ate and innovate on patented inventions. The proposed compulsory license 
or remedy limitation gives prior patent owners the incentive to share their 
inventions with follow-on patent owners while follow-on patent owners are 
rewarded with the freedom to operate their follow-on inventions. In other 
words, to promote technology sharing, patents should encourage innovators 
to innovate on patented inventions, which would result in follow-on inven-
tions involving the technical advance over the patented invention. The U.S. 
patent system has already incorporated several mechanisms to encourage 
technology-sharing in the form of exceptions and limitations on patent 
rights.287 However, the U.S. patent system creates a strong disincentive for 
innovators to operate and innovate on patented inventions by failing to in-
clude a statutory experimental use exception, thus preventing others from 
conducting experiments on patented inventions in order to develop im-
provements. 
In Europe and Asia, patent law regimes provide for statutory experi-
mental use exceptions.288 For example, the Federal Court of Justice in Ger-
many interpreted the exception to cover all types of activities to innovate 
patented inventions, which activities would otherwise give rise to infringe-
ment without the exception.289 The German Patent Act provides separately 
for an exception to cover activities for collecting data through clinical trials 
for a marketing approval.290 The Supreme Court of Japan also has interpret-
ed the exception broadly to cover not only activities for improving patented 
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inventions but also clinical trials conducted on patented drugs by generic 
drug manufacturers.291 This exception is endorsed by the international patent 
community as shown by the flexibility to carve out the scope of patent pro-
tection under TRIPS.292
U.S. scholars cite various reasons to import a fair-use-type infringement 
exception from copyrights to patents.293 However, these proposals urge 
courts to apply the exception on a case-by-case basis with respect to a set of 
factors,294 which may result in uncertainty surrounding the right to operate 
and innovate on patented inventions. Other proposals are very modest, and 
build on the common law experimental use doctrine.295 These proposals 
have attempted to clarify and expand the marginal scope of the exception 
available under current case law.296 Rebecca Eisenberg made a unique pro-
posal that addresses the needs of the bioscience community. Her proposal 
considers researchers and scientists in public and industrial laboratories as 
the main innovators and recommends excluding ordinary consumers from 
the protections of an experimental exception.297 Although her proposal gives 
research activities leading improvements immunity from injunction, it re-
quires a royalty payment to the patent holder if the activities result in an im-
provement that does not fall within the scope of the original patent.298 De-
spite the numerous proposals that have been made by scholars,299 the Federal 
 291. Saik  Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 16, 1999, 1998 (Ju) 153, SAIK  SAIBANSHO MINJI 
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Circuit has refused to expand the marginal scope of the common law exper-
imental exception doctrine.300 Moreover, the Supreme Court made clear that 
the scope does not automatically cover university-based research activi-
ties.301
Congress has also made attempts to codify the exception, but has yet to 
do so due to the lack of consensus on the scope of the proposed exception 
and the difficulty presented by its implementation.302 A 1990 bill provided 
immunity when using and making a patented invention for research or ex-
perimental use purposes regardless of the field of technology.303 Another bill 
introduced in 2002 restricted the application of such an exception to inven-
tions in a specific field of technology.304 The National Science Foundation 
(“NSF”) campaigned to codify the exception by publishing reports and pro-
posing language defining the scope of the exception.305 The American Intel-
lectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) supported NSF’s efforts.306
ving N. Feit, Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent In-
fringement, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 819, 840 (1989); Ned A. Israelsen, Mak-
ing, Using, and Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) and the Ex-
perimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 457, 472-78 (1988-1989); 
Suzanne T. Michel, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to Federally 
Funded Inventions, 7 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 369, 397-409 (1992); Janice M. Mueller, No 
“Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for 
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2001); Nicholas Short, A Research Ex-
emption for the 21st Century, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM CAVEAT 1, 1 (2016); Patricia M. 
Thayer & Richard A. De Liberty, The Research Exception to Patent Infringement: The Time 
Has Come for Legislation, 4 J. BIOLAW & BUS. 15, passim (2000); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Ex-
perimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J.
2169, 2186 (1991). 
 300. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 301. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Some proposed to 
give an umbrella protection for university-based research activities. E.g., Eyal H. Barash, 
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Broadening the Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light of Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1059, 1111-12 (2004). 
 302. See Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting 
The Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1299, 1310-14 (2008). 
 303. See, e.g., Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990, H.R. 
5598, 101st Cong. § 402 (1990) (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 2710). 
 304. See, e.g., Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 
107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (explaining the exception covered only patents on genetic sequences); 
see also Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). 
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Although none of these efforts led to the codification of an experi-
mental exception, recent case law developments at the Supreme Court have 
provided some reprieve to researchers in the biomedical field by banning 
the patenting of isolated DNA307 and expanding the clinical trial exception to 
cover new drug development activities.308 Also, state universities and re-
search institutions are protected from infringement assertion through state 
sovereign immunity regardless of the nature of their activities.309
Unfortunately, these case law developments provide no comfort to 
commercial firms that use or innovate on patented inventions. The majority 
of these proposals and public campaigns focused on immunizing basic re-
search rather than applied research.310 Some proposals at least acknowledged 
the network effect of the computer industry through standards and urged 
weaker patent protection by introducing a fair use defense.311 Additionally, 
the lack of a statutory exception discourages users from reconstructing pa-
tented products for experimentation and eliminates the opportunity for firms 
to learn from users and improve the success rate of new products.312
Moreover, the U.S. patent system discourages individual innovators 
from engaging in any type of innovation because the U.S. Patent Act pro-
vides no statutory exception for private, non-commercial uses of patented 
inventions. In Europe and Asia, a private use exception protects individual 
innovators who practice and improve patented inventions.313 U.S. patent 
owners typically do not sue individuals, but more often will sue commercial 
firms, i.e., indirect infringers who aid individuals, i.e., direct infringers.314
(2004), https://www.aipla.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/documents/nas092304.pdf?
sfvrsn=d8f7fdf8_3.
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of a research activity); Eisenberg & Rai, supra note 299, at 295-300 (arguing for the scope 
covering only publicly sponsored research). 
 311. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 293, at 1212, 1226. 
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 313. E.g., Tokkyoh  [Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 69 (explaining that patent 
rights do not extend for the purposes of experimentation or research); Patentgesetz [PatG] [Pa-
tent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1, § 11(2b), as amended, 
Oct. 8, 2017, 3546, art. 4 (Ger.). 
314. Contra Daniel Nazer, Actually, Mr. Waxman, Consumers Are Sued for Patent In-
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Von Hippel encourages commercial firms to support user innovation by 
providing design tools and platform products.315 Unfortunately, such activi-
ties may constitute inducement or contributory infringement if modifica-
tions developed by individuals infringe patented inventions.316 Notably, a 
recent Supreme Court decision, Akamai, increased the risk of patent in-
fringement for individual programmers who engage in distributed innova-
tions either through the direct or control theory or the joint enterprise theo-
ry.317 The exclusive side of U.S. patent rights should be limited by 
introducing a private use exception for encouraging user innovation.318 The 
private use exception should protect commercial firms’ activities supporting 
individual users’ innovations. Courts should find infringement only when 
firms adopt modifications that are privately developed by individual users, 
and then go on to commercially sell products that include the modifications. 
Conclusion
The current patent system was invented and developed in the eighteenth 
century, long before the development of the computer and the Internet. The 
hyperlinked society brought on by emerging technologies in the era of In-
dustry 4.0 has drastically changed the way we manufacture products, deliver 
services, and engage in innovation. Utilitarian theories rationalizing the pa-
tent system no longer apply to firms in complex technologies – which are 
the core industrial sectors in the era of Industry 4.0 – because they are no 
longer able to profit by selling products or services at supracompetitive 
prices. Nevertheless, these firms continue to obtain patents because patents 
are required to share technologies with others. Individual users, and particu-
larly programmers in the OSS community, also collaborate with firms in 
complex technologies and use patents for sharing their technological im-
provements. Patents provide these new innovators with incentives to share 
by rewarding them with the freedom to operate and innovate, thereby stimu-
lating cooperation and collaboration in the highly distributed innovation 
model. 
Patent policies should reflect these changes to the incentive and innova-
tion models. Unfortunately, the current patent system continues to be based 
on outmoded policies developed in the pre-Internet era that focused on pro-
 315. VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING, supra note 55, at 128. 
 316. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2012). 
 317. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (en banc). 
 318. See Andrew W. Torrance & Eric von Hippel, The Right to Innovate, 2015 
MICH. ST. L. REv. 793, 823 (2015) (“It may also be valuable to consider the wisdom of free-
ing producers from legal liability if they support innovating users (which they may wish to do 
when users are working in areas of interest to the firm) without oversight or control of what 
users create.”). 
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ducer firms that practice the closed innovation model with discrete technol-
ogies. Historically, such firms used patents to exclude others and created 
monopoly deadweight losses, which hinder innovation. Today, patents do 
not provide the power to control markets, and many patent policies are out-
dated. In particular, an overemphasis on the exclusive side of patent rights 
favors non-practicing patent owners over practicing patent owners and leads 
to anti-patent rhetoric in the complex technology sectors of U.S. industry. 
Current patent policies are also outdated because they fail to consider the 
new ways that patents are used in open innovation. The proposed reform 
should make exclusive and inclusive sides of patent rights better balanced 
and neutrally favor all patent practicing firms that want to use patents exclu-
sively or inclusively. The exclusive side is weakened only if the patent 
owner undervalues the follow-on inventions. Moreover, the weakened ex-
clusive side discourages PAEs from enforcing patents of marginal value in-
ventions. With a new utilitarian theory, the patent system’s fundamental in-
stitutional designs and concepts could be reevaluated and updated to meet 
the needs of new innovators and innovation processes for Industry 4.0 and 
beyond. This article has begun such a reevaluation with the very basic no-
tion of patents as property rights. Such reevaluation should continue on oth-
er basic notions in order to overhaul the patent system by highlighting the 
proactive role that patents might play in open innovation. 
